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FROM HORSE TRADING TO INSIDER TRADING:




Generally spealng, a corporate insider' may not buy or sell a
corporation's securities while that insider is in possession of
material, nonpublic information relating to that corporation's
securities. This is the so-called "disclose or abstain" rule, embod-
ied in Rule 10b-52 promulgated under Section 10(b)' of the Se-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City Umversity School of Law.
1. The term "insider" is used to refer to an officer, a director, or a controlling
stockholder because those are the persons generally held to have fiduciary duties to
the corporation. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913-16 (1961). The
term "insider trading" is used to mean trading in stock while in possession of mate-
rial, nonpublic information, whether by insiders or not.
2. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951). The "disclose or abstam rule is usually held to derive
from clause c) of the Rule.
3. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any securi-
ty registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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curities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act").4 The law is a
great deal more complex than this simple statement implies;
nevertheless, the courts have not had significant difficulty apply-
ing the basic disclose-or-abstain rule in its simplest form.
The case generally credited with creating the disclose-or-ab-
stain rule is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,' in which execu-
tives of Texas Gulf Sulphur, among others, who were aware that
the company had made a rich mineral strike, purchased shares
of the company's stock.6 The company had not publicized the
strike for a number of reasons, not the least of which was that it
had not yet acquired the land surrounding the area where the
strike had been made,' and it wanted to complete the acquisi-
tion before the public-and the owners of the land-learned of
the strike. The insiders were found to have committed securities
fraud by purchasing stock from sellers who were unaware of the
"real" value of the stock.' No one thought, however, that the
company had entered into a contract fraudulently by purchasing
the land from sellers who were unaware of the "real" value of
the land.9 In fact, the common law of fraud seems to be quite
clear that the company's purchase of the land was not fraud."0
At first glance, there might be a number of reasons for this
difference between contract and securities law, the most obvious
of which is that the securities market is different from the real
property market." Well-functioning capital markets are an es-
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
4. The language of Rule 10b-5 comes from section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994)). The Rule was adopted without discussion in 1943.
See 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3485-88 (3d ed. 1991);
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 921-23
(1967).
5. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
6. See id. at 844.
7. See id. at 843.
8. See id. at 852.
9. The expression "real value" is used here to mean the price based on the best
information currently available, whether public or not.
10. See Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change,
39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 427, n.117 (1995); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROM-
ISE 77-85 (1981).
11. See In Re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961) ('[T"he purchase
and sale of securities is a field in special need of regulation for the protection of
investors."). The Supreme Court has also recognized this fact on at least one occa-
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sential feature of an advanced economy; 12 thus, the securities
acts, for policy reasons, might require disclosure beyond what was
required at common law. Furthermore, given that the oft-cited,
but not undisputed, philosophy of the securities laws is to man-
date full disclosure of corporate information," it makes sense
that mandatory disclosure rules exist in securities transactions.
There is a popular belief that to be healthy a securities market
must be perceived to be "fair"; securities regulators around the
world have adopted antifraud provisions modeled on Rule 10b-5
in an effort to attract investors to their exchanges.' 4 A credible
account of the disclose-or-abstain rule, therefore, is that it is a
deliberate alteration of the common law intended to banish the
rule of caveat emptor in the stock market, to encourage wider
participation, to reduce the cost of capital, and, thus, to increase
the competitiveness of American companies." There is, however,
a problem with that account. 6 In 1980, the Supreme Court, in-
sion. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194, 201 (1963); see
also Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 326-28 (1979) (describing the stock
market as exceptional because of the extensive information constantly becoming
available).
12. Cf. Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. 134, 154 (1850) (considering the importance of
public faith in the auction process).
13. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); cf. Steve Thel, The Origi-
nal Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385,
390-92 nn.25-31 (1990) (stating that the 1934 Act is concerned mainly with market
regulation and "has little to do with disclosure").
14. See, e.g., Eugenio Ruggiero, Regulation of Insider Trading in Italy, 22 BROOK.
J. INVL L. 157, 160-61 (1996); Lynda M. Ruiz, Note, European Community Directive
on Insider Dealing: A Model for Effective Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider
Trading in International Securities Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 217, 218-19
n.10-13 (1995); Rupert Bruce, U.S., Britain Spur Asia Toward Reform, INfL, HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 1 1994; Matt Marshall, Germany's Law on Insider Trading Brings a Con-
vition, WAL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1995, at AS.
15. For a list of sources on this point, see 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at
3451-58, nn.3, 6, 11.
16. Actually, there are several problems with that account. For example, there is
a large body of law and economics literature devoted to the proposition that prohibi-
tions on insider trading have no effect whatsoever on encouraging investors to par-
ticipate in the market; rather, investors simply adjust their investing behavior based
on their assessment of the risks that other market participants may have "inside in-
formation," just as they adjust for other risks (by diversifying their portfolios, for
example). See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
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terpreting Rule 10b-5 in Chiarella v. United States,'7 held that
the Rule only prohibited "fraud." s Although the definition of
fraud under Rule 10b-5 was not limited strictly to common law
fraud, the Court was quite clear in its rejection of the argument
that Rule 10b-5 required full disclosure in every case." What-
ever the securities laws may have done otherwise, they did not
abrogate the rule of caveat emptor, if, in fact, such was the com-
mon law rule before the securities laws were enacted.
What, then, becomes of the disclose-or-abstain rule? The Court
preserved the disclose-or-abstain rule as it applies to corporate
insiders because such insiders owe fiduciary duties to their
shareholders and, therefore, have a duty to disclose material
facts.2" That holding did not comport with the common law,
however, because before 1934, not only were insiders generally
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 325-26.
17. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. See id. at 234-35.
19. See id. at 233.
20. See id. at 230. This theory works for insiders who are buying stock because
the sellers will necessarily be stockholders at the time of the transaction. It would
not apply to insiders selling stock to nonstockholders. The Court solved this problem
by adopting prior authority that an insider seller acquires a duty to, a buyer (a
prospective shareholder) by virtue of the transaction. See id. at 227 n.8; see also
Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 123, 127 n.21 (discussing Chiarella's analysis of
an insider seller's obligation to a nonstockholder buyer). Such a proposition was
disputed, to put it mildly, at common law. Compare Old Dominion Copper Mining &
Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 212-17 (1908) (holding that a corporation
does not have a claim against a promoter because all current shareholders at the
time of the promoter's acts consented to those acts) with Old Dominion Copper Min-
ing & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 89 N.E. 193 (Mass. 1909) (rejecting the Supreme
Court's reasoning and ruling that the corporation does have a claim because addi-
tional, future subscribers were contemplated a time of the promoter's acts). Under
the fiduciary duty theory, Rule 10b-5 also would not apply to insiders trading op-
tions or other derivative securities, but that particular problem was solved by Con-
gress when it added section 20(d) to the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1988), which
generally provides that trades of options are to be treated as trades of the underly-
ing securities for insider trading purposes. See generally Steve Thel, Section 20(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act: Congress, the Supreme Court, the SEC and the Process
of Defining Insider Trading, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1261 (1991) (discussing the implications
of Congress's belief that insider trading in stock options is essentially the same as
insider trading in stock). The theory continues to be inappropriate for bondholders,
to whom insiders owe no fiduciary duty. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State
Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH & LEE L. REV.
1189, 1213 et seq. (1995).
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permitted to trade stock based on nonpublic information,2' it
was doubtful whether insiders owed any fiduciary duties to their
shareholders, as opposed to the corporation as an entity.2
Since 1980, however, it has been the law that it is fraud, under
the 1934 Act, for a corporate insider to trade the stock of her
corporation while in possession of material, nonpublic informa-
tion. Such a transaction, unlike the purchase of land with a
mine on it, is fraud because, in theory, the trader owes a fiducia-
ry duty to the opposite party in the transaction-the
corporation's current and future stockholders-and the remedy,
therefore, should be disgorgement of the insider's profits.'
The Chiarella decision spawned what seems to be a new aca-
demic discipline. Hardly a month goes by without an article on
insider trading appearing in one legal journal or another.'
Some of the debate has revolved around whether it is even desir-
able to regulate insider trading at all. Few contemporary com-
mentators advocate permitting all insider trading, but there is a
great deal of debate on just what kinds of insider trading to
prohibitY Almost everyone agrees, for example, that true cor-
21. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
22. See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1218-22.
23. In fact, the theory holds as far as the remedy goes. In the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(1988), Congress amended the 1934 Act to provide that contemporaneous traders
may recover their losses from insider traders; however, insider traders may not be
required to pay more in damages than the amount of their profits.
24. See 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 3448-51, n.1 (listing academic works
on the subject). See, e.g., Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(B) and the Vagaries of Fed-
eral Common Law: The Merits of Codifyingthe Private Cause of Action Under a
Structuralist Approach, 97 U. ILL. L. REV. 71 (1997); Robert A. Prentice, Locating
that 'Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistant" Line Between Primary and Secondary
Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997); Shawn J. Lindquist, Note,
United States v. O'Hagarn The Eighth Circuit Throws the Second Strike to the Mis-
appropriation Theory of Rule 1OB-5 Liability, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 197; Michael J.
Voves, Comment, United States v. O'Hagan: Improperly Incorporating Common Law
Fiduciary Obligations into § 14(E) of the Securities Exchange Act, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1015 (1997).
25. For a lucid summary of the debate, see 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at
3448-66; WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 13-39 (1996);
cf ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 329 (1932). Berle and Means noted:
Debate as to the desirability of the rule [against insider trading] is per-
haps profitless. Opinion seems to be divided among business men them-
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porate insiders should not be permitted to trade with inside
information, but that market and company analysts should be
allowed to do so. Where the line between those cases should be
drawn, however, remains problematic, as does the legal support
for the rules drawing such lines.26
Meanwhile, since Chiarella, the federal courts have been left
to determine what exactly is common law fraud in the securities
context. The SEC has tried occasionally to enforce a level play-
ing field by prosecuting anyone with superior, nonpublic infor-
mation. Defendants have included a corporate psychiatrist of an
executive's wife7 and a popular football coach in an advanta-
geous spot at a track meet.28 The courts have attempted to pro-
duce a theory capable of determining when such trading is
fraud. Recently, the Supreme Court approved a version of the
"misappropriation theory" developed by several federal courts of
appeal as a definition of insider trading.29 That theory answers
some questions but raises others. The scholarly commentators
and the courts have thus united in an effort to articulate a stan-
dard for insider trading. In so doing, they take their places in
the ranks of jurists through the centuries who have wrestled
selves, some holding that the making of incidental profits from trading in
the stock of his corporation is one of the ways by which a director gets
paid; others, that it should not be permitted save under extraordinary
circumstances.
Id. Part of the debate has revolved around the question whether anyone is actually
harmed by insider trading. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra, at 41-117; infra notes
316-23 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., GULiAN C. VERPLANcK, AN ESSAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF CoNTRAcTs
57 (1825) ("If there is a distinction in these and thousands of other similar cases
where the law applies widely different rules, where is the line to be drawn?");
Brudney, supra note 11, at 342-43 (addressing the cost-benefit analysis of denial of
informational advantages); Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory
Disclosure and Prohibitions Against Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theory
of Inside Information is Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 169, 174 (1993) (address-
ing the need for a line defining insider trading).
27. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Jeff Cole, Ther-
apist Pleads Guilty to Fraud in Trading of Lockheed Stock, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14,
1995, at B5.
28. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). Switzer's location at
the track meet enabled him to overhear information about a proposed merger. See
id. at 762. The court ruled in favor of the defendants. See id. at 767.
29. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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with the question: "When is it unlawful to buy or sell a thing
when you know something the other party doesn't?"0
This Article is intended to place the insider trading debate in
its historical context by examining the arguments made in re-
cent cases and commentary and comparing them to arguments
made in analogous contexts in the past two centuries.3' Re-
markably, the arguments made through the decades hardly have
changed at all. Virtually every approach proposed in the
Rule 10b-5 literature has direct nineteenth century precursors
and remains subject to the same objections that rendered it
unacceptable in its earlier appearances. Similarly, Rule 10b-5
cases are just as inconsistent, and the reasoning of the cases
just as unsatisfactory, as the common law insider trading cases
of a century ago or the general fraud cases of 150 years ago. In
short, legal minds and the law itself have been unable to solve
one of the most basic questions of commercial behavior: "When
must I tell my trading partner what I know?" Faced with the
inadequacies of legal solutions, courts and commentators have
fallen back on nonlegal standards of ethical behavior, perhaps in
tacit acknowledgment of the limitations of legal method.
This Article begins with an attempt to summarize the current
law and its legal development. Part I addresses the Supreme
Court's fiduciary trading rule, including common law precursors
to the rule; the Court's decision; the treatment of Chiarella in
lower federal courts since 1980; and the recent decision in Unit-
ed States v. O'Hagan.32 Part II examines the various consider-
ations courts and commentators have used in attempting to
define the ideal trading rule and traces the use of those consid-
erations in various contexts over the past two centuries. Finally,
Part I considers the extent to which stock market transactions
30. The earliest legal treatment of the issue located, appears in CICERO, DE OFFI-
CUS [ON DUTIES] Book III, §§ 50-72 (Harry G. Edinger trans., 1974) (44 B.C.). I
have limited the scope of this paper to American cases and commentary appearing
after 1815.
31. This analysis is confined primarily to liability for fraud, although the doctrine
of unilateral mistake would also be applicable in many of the cases discussed. This
Article attempts to include representative examples from the insider trading litera-
ture instead of providing exhaustive or comprehensive references to the voluminous
materials available.
32. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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differ from other transactions and what the implications of those
differences might be. In conclusion, this Article returns to the
implacability of the problems presented and the law's reliance
on other standards of behavior.
I. INSIDER TRADING, THE FIDUCIARY TRADING RULE, AND THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
The general rule at common law was that there was no fraud
liability for "mere silence"; in other words, a knowledgeable
party could buy from or sell to an ignorant party unless there
was a "duty to disclose" the nonpublic fact.3" The problem with
that rule was that no one was quite sure what would give rise to
a duty to disclose. Some commentators claimed that any superi-
or information gave rise to a duty to disclose.' If this were
true, however, the exception would completely swallow the
rule.35 Nevertheless, the common law recognized a duty to dis-
close based solely on superior knowledge in two situations:
When the knowledgeable party was an expert, such as an art
dealer, and the ignorant party relied on the other's expertise,"8
and when the nonpublic fact was a latent defect that the igno-
rant party could not discover for himself.37 There was also a
duty to disclose when the nonpublic "fact" was hidden by a false
impression produced by the knowledgeable party." The clearest
33. See, e.g., Peek v. Gurney, [1861-73] All E.R. 116 (H.L. 1873) (appeal taken
from M.R.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1) (1977); 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 204-08, 213-18 (1836).
34. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 378 (1827) (describing
the duty to disclose any information not available to the other party); cf In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (discussing why the obligation to disclose
is not limited to corporate insiders).
35. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 10, at 80; STORY, supra note 33, § 205, at 214-15.
36. See STORY, supra note 33, § 198, at 208; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551 illus. 6-8 (1977) (illustrating the rule that there is no obligation to provide
information when the facts are patent or both parties have equal opportunity to ob-
tain the information).
37. Originally, this rule was limited to defects in manufactured goods that could
cause bodily injury. See W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment & Non-disclosure, 15
TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (1936).
38. See Keeton, supra note 37, at 2-7. This is actually more properly a case of con-
cealment than of failure to disclose or mere silence, but it is included here because of its
relevance to the insider trading cases. See infra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
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duty to disclose was that which arose between fiduciary and
beneficiary.
Clearly, it is unlawful for a knowledgeable party to buy from
or sell to an ignorant party when the knowledgeable party owes
a fiduciary duty to the ignorant party." This rule (the "fiducia-
ry trading rule") can be traced at least to Joseph Story's early
nineteenth century treatises and probably earlier.4" Given that
some fiduciaries are prohibited completely from transacting
business with their beneficiaries without consent,41 the prohibi-
tion on transactions where information is unequal is not particu-
larly startling. This rule is such a basic part of fiduciary law
that it rarely receives more than a cross-reference in discussions
of the general law of sales or fraud.42 Nevertheless, the fiducia-
ry trading rule developed significance in the second half of the
nineteenth century when stockholders tried to use it to support
a claim for insider trading against corporate officers and direc-
tors. The courts generally rejected their claims, not because the
rule was suspect, but because corporate insiders did not owe
fiduciary duties to their stockholders. Nevertheless, plaintiffs
continued to sue insider traders on the fiduciary trading theory,
and a minority rule allowing such suits to go forward developed.
At the time the securities acts were enacted, both the majority
and minority rules had ample support in the law.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 551(2)(a) (1977). There is always a
prior issue involved here: Who owes a fiduciary duty to whom? Much of the case
law on the misappropriation theory described below can be criticized for misapplying
basic fiduciary concepts. A discussion of those issues is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle. For an introduction to the problems of fiduciary duties, see Deborah A.
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879;
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983).
40. See STORY, supra note 33, § 218, at 224; VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 52-53,
188-89.
41. See 2A AUSTIN W. SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 170-170.23 (1987) (determining that once
it is shown that the trustee traded with the beneficiary with respect to the trust
corpus, "no further inquiry" will be made).
42. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 33, § 218, at 224.
1998] 1297
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1289
A. The Majority Rule: Corporate Insiders Owe No Duty to
Shareholders
One of the first cases to consider what we know as insider
trading was Carpenter v. Danforth.4" The lower court in that
case stated that, "[tihough probably the relation of trustee and
cestui que trust did not strictly exist" between the plaintiff stock-
holder and the defendant director, "considering their situation
and relations to the stock in question," the defendant "was
bound to disclose to the plaintiff all the material facts within his
knowledge, which tended to enhance the value of the stock."'
The Appellate Division reversed.45
[Tihe trust put in the directors usually extends ... only to the
management of the general affairs of the corporation .... The
plaintiffs stock was not the subject of trust between them, ...
except so far as the good or bad management of the general
affairs of the corporation by its directors, indirectly affects the
value of its stock.4
The court also reasoned that stock traded in the market is
bought and sold at a market price without any reference to the
"real value" of the shares. It would therefore not make sense to
place a duty on a director, trading in the market, to disclose
facts bearing on the real value of the stock.47 Because the rule
affecting directors should be the same regardless of the manner
in which the stock is traded, there also could be no duty to dis-
close even in a face-to-face transaction.4"
The court's holding in Carpenter that the director's admitted
duty to the corporation did not extend to the shareholder with
43. 19 Abb. Pr. 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865), rev'd, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. App. Div.
1868). There was at least one prior case, Spence v. Whitaker, 3 Port. 297 (Ala.
1836), in which the court held for the plaintiff because only the defendant had the
ability to know the actual value of the stock. See id. at 324-26.
44. Carpenter, 19 Abb. Pr. at 227.
45. See Carpenter, 52 Barb. at 581.
46. Id. at 584.
47. For a rejection of this argument, see BERLE & MEANS, supra note 25, at 328.
For a discussion of the role of an impersonal trading market in insider trading anal-
ysis, see infra notes 305-327 and accompanying text.
48. See Carpenter, 52 Barb. at 586.
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respect to his shares49 was adopted quickly by other courts. In
1873 the Indiana Supreme Court, 0 and in 1874 the Tennessee
Supreme Court,"' rendered decisions closely following Carpen-
ter. The Carpenter holding thus became the majority rule.52
Cases following Carpenter often relied on the earlier case of
Smith v. Hurd,53 which involved an action by stockholders
against the directors for, essentially, waste and mismanage-
ment. Chief Justice Shaw wrote that the action belonged to the
corporation and not to the individual shareholders because the
injury was to the corporation and its creditors and only indirect-
ly to the stockholders.' Smith v. Hurd is, therefore, part of the
foundation of the derivative suit.55 Needless to say, perhaps,
the reasoning in Smith v. Hurd does not necessarily require a
holding that directors do not owe a duty to stockholders with
respect to the purchase of their individual shares,6 although in
49. The court in Carpenter discussed that the information that the plaintiff alleged
had been withheld (a favorable government contract) was in fact unknown to the
insider, or at most speculative, at the time of the stock purchase. Also, the court
framed the ultimate question as "Did [the defendant] intentionally do or say any-
thing, to divert or prevent.., the plaintiff from looking into, or making inqui-
ry ... as to the affairs or condition of the company." Id. at 589. This formula de-
rives from the general law of fraud, which required that a party remain strictly si-
lent-neither actively lying nor taking steps to prevent inquiry. See Dalley, supra
note 10, at 426-27.
50. See Tippecanoe County Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 513 (1873).
51. See Deaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. 108 (1874).
52. See, e.g., Stout v. Cunningham, 196 P. 208 (Idaho 1921); Walsh v. Goulden, 90
N.W. 406 (Mich. 1902); Crowell v. Jackson, 23 A. 426 (N.J. 1891); Krumbhaar v.
Griffiths, 25 A. 64 (Penn. 1892); Haarstick v. Fox, 33 P. 251 (Utah 1893); see also
A.A. Berle, Jr., Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 MICH. L.
REv. 827, 828-29 (1927) (stating majority rule); Clarence D. Laylin, The Duty of a
Director Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27 YALE L.J. 731, 731-32 (1918) (stating majori-
ty rule); H. L. Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a
Shareholder, 8 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1910) (stating majority rule); R.E. Heinselman,
Annotation, Duty of Officer or Director of Corporation toward One from whom he
Purchases Stock, 84 A.L.R. 615, 630 et seq. (1933) (stating majority rule).
53. 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847). The court in Carpenter did not cite Smith v.
Hurd.
54. See id. at 384-86.
55. The equitable remedy for shareholders' derivative claims was recognized in
Massachusetts in Peabody v. Flint, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 52 (1863). See also Dodge v.
Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 342 (1855) (stating that "where the legal remedy against a
corporation is inadequate, a court of equity will interfere").
56. The law today, of course, requires that shareholders sue derivatively for gener-
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many nineteenth century cases it is difficult to tell whether the
gist of the plaintiffs claim is waste or insider trading. Many
stockholders alleged that the insiders managed the company and
controlled the flow of information so as to depress the stock
price-by not paying dividends, taking out large loans, painting
a gloomy picture of business prospects, etc.-and then, knowing
that the stockholders were under a misapprehension, the insid-
ers purchased the stock for less than they knew it was worth.57
The company then would experience a miraculous turnaround
and proceed to pay large dividends. It is perhaps not surprising
to see Smith v. Hurd cited in such cases.
Smith v. Hurd is also important because it established a pre-
cedent recognizing the corporation as an entity and denying privi-
ty between shareholders and directors.58 The question of wheth-
er directors owed fiduciary duties directly to their stockholders,
rather than to the corporate entity as a whole, had implications
beyond the insider trading cases. The legal conception of the cor-
poration-as an artificial entity, as an "aggregate" akin to a part-
nership, or as a "natural" entity-was in flux from the 1870s to
the 1920s," and the insider trading cases were doubtless influ-
enced by those theoretical concerns. The controversy over the
entity theory of the corporation may explain why in many late
nineteenth and early twentieth century cases, the courts ex-
alized harm to the corporation from mismanagement, see infra text accompanying
notes 109-11, but also allows trading shareholders to sue insiders directly for insider
trading under the 1934 Act. See SEC v. Texas Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-52
(2d Cir. 1968).
57. See, e.g., Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 F. 522 (6th Cir. 1897) (discussing the
defendants' mismanagement of all aspects of the corporation in order to depreciate
stock values); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277 (Kan. 1904) (addressing the turnaround
in financial condition of troubled bank not reflected in books); Woodruff v. Cole, 269
S.W. 599 (Mo. 1925) (discussing a defendant who caused the company to enter into
debt and fail to pay dividends); Wann v. Scullin, 109 S.W. 688 (Mo. 1908) (discuss-
ing the defendants who allegedly depressed the railroad's value by reducing fares
and then bought the company); Von Au v. Magenheimer, 110 N.Y.S. 629 (App. Div.
1908) (addressing the case in which the defendant stated it was unlikely the compa-
ny would ever pay dividends).
58. See Smith, 53 Mass. at 384.
59. See MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960
65-108 (1992). For an earlier discussion of fiduciary duties, the entity theory of the
corporation, and insider trading, see BERLE & MEANS, supra note 25, at 221-26;
Laylin, supra note 52, at 733 et seq.
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pounded unnecessarily on the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between insiders and their stockholders in cases involving unre-
lated issues or factual settings." In other cases, the courts ex-
pressly refused to consider the fiduciary duty question.6
There are explanations for the majority rule other.than that it
accorded with the understanding of the corporation as a separate
entity. There may be an instrumentalist explanation-that courts
were concerned that people would not be willing to serve as direc-
tors if they were not able to profit from their positions.62 Addi-
tionally, some courts attributed the plaintiffs loss and the
insider's gain simply to luck, business acumen, and willingness to
take risks.' The majority rule, in those courts' view, simply re-
flected the realities of the business world." Additionally, some
courts based their decisions on the fact that the corporate books
were available by statute to any shareholder. If a shareholder
imprudently neglected to examine the books prior to agreeing to a
sale, then he or she should not be allowed later to complain that
60. See, e.g., Steinfeld v. Nielson, 100 P. 1094, 1101-02 (Ariz. 1909) (discussing
an insider's fiduciary duty in a case in which the seller was also an insider and
in which the price was not inadequate); Stout v. Cunningham, 196 P. 208, 209
(Idaho 1921) (stating in dictum that an insider owes no duty in a case not involv-
ing a corporate officer and not involving insider trading); Mulvane v. O'Brien, 49
P. 607, 612 (Kan. 1897) (stating in dictum that an insider owes a duty in a case
in which insider was also seller's agent); Walsh v. Goulden, 90 N.W. 406, 409
(Mich. 1902) (stating in dictum that an insider does not owe a duty in a case not
involving a failure to disclose); Von Au, 110 N.Y.S. at 629 (stating in dictum that
an insider owes a duty in a case involving actual fraud); Haarstick v. Fox, 33 P.
251, 253 (Utah 1893) (stating in dictum that an insider has no duty in a case not
involving inside information).
61. See, e.g., Woodruff, 269 S.W. at 604; Baird v. Granniss, 106 S.W. 980, 982
(Mo. 1907).
62. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Grant v. Attrill, 11 F. 469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (rejecting a claim
of duty); Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 233, (Ga. 1903) (finding a fiduciary duty);
Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 281 (Kan. 1904) (noting the advantages of skill and
judgment but also finding a fiduciary duty); Boulden v. Stilwell, 60 A. 609, 612 (Md.
1905) ("it must be held his own lack of business prudence and business courage
which caused him to cancel his contract and sell his stock under the circumstances
stated"); Woodruff, 269 S.W. at 601, 604 (discussing the fact that the plaintiff ad-
vocated a policy that was rejected by the board; therefore, the board's policy ulti-
mately paid off); infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
64. For a vehement argument in favor of the majority rule on these grounds,
see Roberts Walker, The Duty of Disclosure of a Director Purchasing Stock from His
Stockholders, 32 YALE L.J. 637 (1923).
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the purchase price was too low.65 Courts often neglected to offer
any justification for the rule. Sometimes, however, they acknowl-
edged the immorality of the defendant's acts but noted that the
dictates of law and morality do not always coincide.'
B. The Minority View: Corporate Insiders Owe Duties to
Shareholders
The sense that the defendant behaved immorally or unfairly
seems to underlie the minority rule, which developed more or
less concurrently with the majority view. One of the earlier
cases allowing a plaintiff to recover from an insider who bought
the plaintiff's shares at an artificially low price was Fisher v.
Budlong" The court in Fisher noted that, although the usual
rule in sales was that neither party had a duty to disclose ma-
terial information, the rule differed where there was a "peculiar
relation implying confidence or leading to confidence" between
the parties.68 The equities in Fisher were in favor of the plain-
tiff: the defendant professed to be aiding the plaintiff in finding
a buyer for the stock; the defendant then purchased the stock
surreptitiously through a straw man.69 The court stated:
although any single officer cannot perhaps be considered as
standing in the relation of trustee to each stockholder,
yet... it would be considered as a reason for confidence, and
more especially when this officer is practically the sole man-
ager of the corporation, and the stockholder has a right to
65. See Oliver, 45 S.E. at 234; Walsh, 90 N.W. at 410; Woodruff, 269 S.W. at 604,
601; . This, too, was simply a recognized doctrine in the law of fraud, arising from
the requirement that the plaintiffs reliance on the defendant's representations be
reasonable. See Dalley, supra note 10, at 419-24.
66. See, e.g., Grant, 11 F. at 470; Boulden, 60 A. at 610.
67. 10 R.I. 525 (1873). An earlier case was Walsham v. Stainton, 46 Eng. Rep.
268 (Ch. 1863). That case was often cited by later cases finding a fiduciary duty,
but in Walsham, the nature of the company was unclear. The justices referred to
the members of the company sometimes as "partners" and sometimes as "sharehold-
ers," and the organization, which may have been a joint-stock company, had certain
partnershiplike features, such as monthly meetings of members. The case was often
cited, however, for the language that "[algents are, in a sense, trustees." Id. at 272.
68. Fisher, 10 R.I. at 528.
69. This might have created a cause of action for misrepresentation, if the defen-
dant actually lied to the plaintiff. The court did not discuss such a claim, however.
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call on him for this very information [about the value of the
stock] .70
The plaintiff had a legal right to rely on the defendant's state-
ments, and the defendant should have known that his state-
ments would be so relied on by the plaintiff.7' The plaintiff,
therefore, was able to recover his damages.
Despite this early start, the minority rule did not attract
many judicial adherents until Oliver v. Oliver 2 in 1903. The
court in Oliver discussed at length the relationship between the
shareholders and the directors and concluded that insiders are
"quasi-trustees."3 An insider may not be able to disclose cer-
tain corporate secrets, but "it does not follow that he may use
[such information] to his own advantage, and to the disadvan-
tage of one whom he also represents." 4 The director, according
to the court, "occupies a fiduciary position and is essentially
within the rule which requires agents.., or other fiduciaries, to
exercise the highest degree of good faith as to all matters con-
nected with the property committed to their care."' The court
reasoned that a rule that the insider did not owe a duty to the
shareholders would lead to the conclusion that "while a director
is bound to serve stockholders en masse, he may antagonize
them one by one; that he is an officer of the company, but may
70. Id. at 529.
71. See ick This reasoning focuses on the reliance element of fraud. Admitted lies
by a defendant will not support a cause of action if the plaintiffs reliance on the
lies was not reasonable. Some insider-buyers therefore sought to avoid liability even
when they actually lied about the value of the company (as was the case in Fisher).
See also Voellmeck v. Harding, 6 P.2d 373, 375 (Wash. 1931) (discussing the right to
rely).
72. 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903).
73. See i. at 233-35.
74. Id. at 234. The court propounded a "disclose or abstain" rule much like that
created by SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See supra
notes 5-10 and accompanying text. "The very fact that he cannot disclose prevents
him from dealing with one who does not know, and to whom material information
cannot be made known." Oliver, 45 S.E. at 234.
75. Oliver, 45 S.E. at 234. The court treated corportate secrets as assets of the
corporation, which a fiduciary (which an insider certainly is with respect to the corporation)
may not use to his personal advantage under basic agency principles. See id.; infra notes
249-65 and accompanying text.
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be the foe of each private in the ranks."76
After Oliver, courts became increasingly willing to allow
plaintiffs' claims against insider traders to go forward.7 The
majority rule cases were criticized as old and outdated and as
leaving shareholders to the mercy of managers." The courts
argued that the law "cannot give its approval to a course of deal-
ing that will permit those occupying a trust relation to be un-
mindful of the trust, betray the confidence reposed, and profit by
such betrayal."79
The U.S. Supreme Court gave further impetus to the trend
allowing plaintiffs to recover when it enunciated the "special
facts" doctrine in Strong v. Repide.8 ° Strong involved a share-
holder who sold out to an insider while an advantageous sale of
the entire company was pending, but not public knowledge."'
The Court ruled that, even if directors do not have a general
duty to their shareholders, there may be a duty where "special
facts" exist.82 In this case, the defendant was conducting the
negotiations for the sale of a company that he had almost com-
plete control over when the sale occurred.' As negotiator, he
76. Oliver, 45 S.E. at 235.
77. Several cases adopted the Oliver holding. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S.
419, 431 (1909); Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 100 P. 1094, 1102 (Ariz. 1909), rev'd, 139 P.
879 (1913); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531, 533 (Kan. 1932); Stewart v. Harris,
77 P. 277 (Kan. 1904); Jacquith v. Mason, 156 N.W. 1041, 1043 (Neb. 1916).
78. See, e.g., Stewart, 77 P. at 280-81.
79. Id. at 281.
80. 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
81. See id This was a common fact pattern. See, e.g., Oliver, 45 S.E. at 232;
Tippecanoe County Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Walsh v. Goulden, 90
N.W. 406 (Mich. 1902); Krumbhaar v. Griffiths, 15 A. 64 (Pa. 1892); Voellmeck v.
Harding, 6 P.2d 373 (Wash. 1931); see also Stout v. Cunningham, 196 P. 208 (Idaho
1921) (addressing a tender offer); Jacquith v. Mason, 156 N.W. 1041 (Neb. 1916) (ad-
dressing the same).
82. Strong, 213 U.S. at 431. Most commentators treat the special facts cases as
distinct from the minority view because the inquiry in the special facts cases focused
not on the fiduciary status of the defendant, but on the nature of the information.
See 7 LoSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 3475. But see Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 228 n.10 (1980) ("The decision in Strong v. Repide was premised upon
the fiduciary duty between the corporate insider and the shareholder."); Berle, supra
note 52, at 834 (noting that the special circumstances rule implies a fiduciary rela-
tionship, contrary to the majority rule). The discussion is included here for the sake
of economy.
83. See Strong, 213 U.S. at 421.
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was "acting substantially as the agent of the shareholders of his
company."' His information about the sale therefore came to
him because of his position as the shareholders' agent.85 Under
these circumstances, he had a duty to disclose the information to
the seller.8 6 Although the facts in Strong were at least some-
what unusual, in that the sale of the company was completely in
the control of the director, the case was cited widely as support-
ing decisions for plaintiffs in a variety of circumstances.
Courts and commentators described the justification for the
minority rule in various ways. One commentator hostile to the
rule noted that "[slince the earlier .[majority rule] decisions,
judicial thought, particularly at a distance from salt water,
seems to have beclouded rather than clarified the state of the
law."'
Courts, in the Mississippi basin especially, seem to cherish a
mental picture of shrewd, sharp, scheming directors craftily
trading with inexperienced, female, infant, defective stock-
holders. In a word, the kind of stockholders for whom the law
should guarantee bank deposits, prohibit cigarettes, or con-
trol reading matter."
The commentators supporting the rule proposed a moral justifi-
cation:
That the director may take advantage of his position to se-
cure the profits that all have won, offends the moral sense;
no shareholder expects to be so treated by the director he
selects; no director would urge his friends to select him for
that reason; that the law yet allows him to do this, does more
to discourage legitimate investment in corporate shares than
almost anything else, and allows the fiction of the corporate
entity to obstruct instead of advance justice."0
84. Id. at 432.
85. See id.
86. This applies the same basic principle of agency law discussed in Oliver. See
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
87. See cases cited in Heinselman, supra note 52, at 630 et seq.
88. Walker, supra note 64, at 639.
89. Id. at 640.
90. Wilgus, supra note 52, at 297; see Laylin, supra note 52, at 732 n.6.
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On a more practical level, many of the minority rule decisions
involved cases in which the insider deliberately concealed his
identity in the purchase of the stock.9 Although none of the
courts were willing to base a legal rule on that fact, such circum-
stances would prevent the plaintiff from being put on guard by
the fact that insiders were buying.
The results in these cases are inconsistent enough to have
caused one commentator to remark that the minority or majority
position "has been assumed on practical grounds, and rejected
on like grounds; and that the supporting reasons have been
props rather than foundations."92 By the time of the securities
acts, the legal rule seemed to be up for grabs. In 1932, the Kan-
sas Supreme Court imposed a seemingly absurd duty on direc-
tors in Hotchkiss v. Fischer.3 In Hotchkiss, the director showed
and explained the company's financial statements to the plain-
tiff. Such action was not enough as the court held that financial
statements do not reflect the true financial condition of the com-
pany unless they are interpreted by an expert in light of market
and other conditions. 4 The following year, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts rejected the fiduciary trading theory
and supported a director's right to trade the stock of his compa-
ny at will.95 When the Supreme Court in 1980 implied that pur-
chase or sale transactions between shareholders and insiders
were fraudulent at common law, and therefore prohibited under
Rule 10b-5, because of the fiduciary relationship between the
parties,9 it therefore was supported by some, but not unani-
mous, precedent.
91. The Court paid considerable attention to this fact in Strong. See Strong v.
Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1909); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277 (Kan 1904); Jacquith
v. Mason, 156 N.W. 1041 (Neb. 1916); Fisher v. Budlong, 10 R.I. 525 (1873).
92. Laylin, supra note 52, at 732.
93. 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932).
94. See id. at 534.
95. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
96. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980).
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C. Chiarella and the Fiduciary Trading Rule Under
Federal Law
In a 1961 decision,97 the SEC opined that the duty to disclose
material information in a stock trade rested on two elements:
the existence of a relationship giving access to information and
the "inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing."'5 The duty was not limited to those owing
a fiduciary duty to shareholders; instead, "insiders" are defined
as those with access to superior information.' The SEC noted
the debate over the fiduciary trading rule under state law but
stated that under federal law, an insider's failure to disclose
material information constituted a violation of the antifraud
provisions of the 1934 Act.' The Cady, Roberts decision repre-
sented the SEC's position on insider trading until the Supreme
Court rejected that approach in Chiarella."'0
Chiarella v. United States..2 involved proposed corporate ac-
quisitions in which Chiarella, an employee of the bidders' finan-
cial printer, was able to discover the identity of the targets and
purchased stock in anticipation of the announcement of the
bids. '° The Court reversed his conviction.' °4 According to the
Court, the rule prohibiting insider trading under federal law was
premised upon the fiduciary duty of the insider and not her
access to information."5 An outsider, therefore, would not vio-
late Rule 10b-5 even if she had special access to nonpublic infor-
97. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
98. Id. at 912.
99. See i&L
100. See id. at 911 & n.13.
101. Prior to Chiarella, the Court considered whether Rule 10b-5 applied to a fail-
ure to disclose in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972). In that case, the Court held that the rule applied where the defendants pur-
chased shares and effectuated others' purchases without disclosing material informa-
tion to the sellers. The Court based the defendants' duty to disclose on the special
relationship they had with the sellers: the defendants were acting on behalf of the
sellers in making a market in the shares. See id. at 152-53.
102. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
103. See id. at 224.
104. See id. at 236-37.
105. See id. at 230.
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mation. Section 10(b) was directed at fraud, and silence does not
constitute fraud unless there is a duty to speak."6 The SEC's
reasoning in Cady, Roberts was flawed because possession of
information alone does not give rise to a duty to disclose. °7
There are a number of problems with the fiduciary trading
approach of Chiarella in addition to its tenuous support at com-
mon law.' For example, the fiduciary approach conflicts with
the concept of the modem corporation as an entity. The question
may have been open to debate in 1900, but in 1980, there was
little question that the corporation is an entity independent of
its shareholders, and that the directors' duty is to the corpora-
tion and only derivatively to the shareholders."9 Following the
106. See id. at 234-35.
107. See id. at 235; supra note 35 and accompanying text. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3 (1996), which prohibits anyone other than a bidder from purchasing
stock in anticipation of a tender offer, was promulgated after the facts giving rise to
Chiarella occurred. Rule 10b-5 is therefore no longer necessary to reach traders in
Chiarella's position. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2215 (1997).
108. Justice Blackmun criticized the majority opinion on this ground, among others.
See Chiarella 445 U.S. at 247-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One defense of Chiarella
notes that most of the common law cases deal with face-to-face transactions, and so
are arguably inapposite to market transactions. See William T. Allen, Professor
Scheppele's Middle Way: On Minimizing Normativity and Economics in Securities
Laws, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 175, 177-79. Because the Court
invoked common law concepts of fraud, however, it seems fair to examine what
those concepts were. Also, Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933), dealt
with a transaction occurring on an exchange, and the court expressly stated that, in
such circumstances, the fiduciary trading rule did not apply.
109. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. 1990) ("Ihe question of 'long-term' versus 'short-term' values [to the share-
holders] is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to chart a
course for a corporation which is in its best interests . . . .") (emphasis added). But
see FRANK H. EASTERBRooK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991) (arguing that the entity concept is only a matter of con-
venience and appearance); id. at 16-17 (arguing that managers are shareholders'
agents under corporate contract). Since 1980, some states have recognized by statute
that directors may have duties to "constituencies" other than shareholders. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (1993); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (1993); MASS GEN.
LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (Supp. 1997); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp.
1997); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (1995). That raises the interesting question of
whether a Rule 10b-5 claim might be brought on the basis of the trader's duty to
customers or employees who might have traded in the stock. For a persuasive argu-
ment that the "other constituency" statutes do not create duties to nonshareholders,
see Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Stat-
utes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991).
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triumph of the entity theory of the corporation between the
wars1 0 and the formalization of the mechanism of the deriva-
tive suit, the only direct claims a shareholder has against the
officers and directors are for denial of the shareholder's funda-
mental participation rights such as voting or receipt of divi-
dends."' All claims related to management, including damage
to the stock price, are derivative. Thus, if a director deliberately
manages the company so as to depress the stock price and there-
by facilitate her own purchases, the shareholders, including
those who sold to her at the depressed price, have only a deriva-
tive claim against her. If, however, the director discovers that
the stock price is depressed, for example, because a new develop-
ment has not yet been made public, and buys stock in the expec-
tation that the price will rise, the selling shareholders' claim,
under Chiarella, is direct.
One might argue that if insiders are fiduciaries for their
shareholders, then Chiarella's restriction of Rule 10b-5 liability
to insiders makes some sense: the purpose of the fiduciary trad-
ing rule is acknowledged generally to be a fear that the fiduciary
will use her position to overreach the beneficiary, who is depen-
dent upon the fiduciary in some way." Even if a stock pur-
chase occurs on an impersonal exchange, the shareholder is
dependent on the insider: the insider, or a group of insiders,
controls the flow of information to the market generally and
thus to the shareholder. But unlike other market participants,
the shareholder, in a sense, has placed the fiduciary in this
position of power over the shareholder by delegating manage-
ment responsibilities to the fiduciary. Under basic fiduciary law,
therefore, the fiduciary should be prohibited from making a
secret profit in a transaction with the beneficiary involving the
subject of the trust-here, the insider's control of the corpora-
tion.' If one rejects the argument that insiders are fiduciaries
110. See HORWITZ, supra note 59, at 68, 86, 106.
111. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir.
1971); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 360 (3d ed. 1983).
112. See Frankel, supra note 39, at 800-01.
113. One problem with this rationale is that the power of the board of directors to
manage the corporation, from which the power of the managers is derived, is not
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for shareholders, however, then this support for Chiarella's im-
position of insider Rule 10b-5 liability collapses."4
In practice, the real problem with the fiduciary trading rule
has been that it seems too narrow. The SEC, the lower federal
courts, and many commentators have taken the view that Rule
10b-5 liability should extend to others beyond insiders.'15 If the
purpose of the rule prohibiting insider trading is to encourage
broad participation in the equity markets by providing a fair
trading environment,1 6 then the prohibition must apply to ev-
eryone whose trading is unfair."7 Chiarella leaves unad-
dressed, for example, the problem of "scalping"-trading by
those with advance, nonpublic information about the content of
influential recommendations by analysts, columnists, and other
advisors."8 The intuition that such trades should be prohibited
delegated by the shareholders. Rather, it arises "naturally" from incorporation. See
Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918).
114. Another problem with the fiduciary rule of Chiarella is that the language of
both Section 10(b), supra note 3, and Rule 1Ob-5, supra note 2, is not limited to
fiduciaries. Nor does the use of the term "deception" necessarily so limit the applica-
tion of the prohibition: the common law recognized a duty to disclose in a variety of
situations other than fiduciary relationships. See Dalley, supra note 10, at 424-28;
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text; Scheppele, supra note 20, at 132-43.
115. Commentators have noted, for example, that the fiduciary rule draws an arbi-
trary line between persons performing the same functions based on whether they are
employees or outside contractors. See EASTERBROOK & FISHEL, supra note 109, at
269-70; Scheppele, supra note 20, at 134-35. This problem has been addressed to
some degree by Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983), which held that some
contractors, such as lawyers and accountants, will be "temporary insiders" for pur-
poses of Rule 10b-5.
116. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
117. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 159-62, 171
passim (1966) (discussing the problem of knowledgeable outsiders and governmental
employees).
118. The most well-known example of this appeared in Carpenter v. United States,
484 U.S. 19 (1987), in which a reporter for the Wall Street Journal made use of his
position to trade in stocks about to be profiled in the influential "Heard on the
Street" column. The Supreme Court split four to four on the misappropriation theory
described below, see id. at 24; see infra notes 121-57 and accompanying text, al-
though it upheld his wire fraud conviction. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 28. Recently,
even thornier issues arose when mutual fund employees traded based on the
nonpublic activities of the fund. See Charles Gasparino & Laura Jereski, Can Fideli-
ty Brokers Spy on Jeff Vink? Not in Scottsdale, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1996, at Al
(discussing brokers fired for "piggybacking" trades on activity by fund manager);
Roger Lowenstein, Intrinsic Value: Fund Industry's Real Conflict of Interest, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 25, 1996, at C1 (addressing the problem of managers trading personally
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is evidenced by publishers' internal policies against scalping. 119
Noninsiders can also gain access to nonpublic information in
other ways." The problem has been to determine when such
noninsiders should be prohibited from trading and to provide a
legal support in the securities laws for such a prohibition.
D. O'Hagan and the Misappropriation Theory
One means of expanding Rule 10b-5 liability beyond tradition-
al insiders is provided by the so-called misappropriation theory.
In Chiarella, the United States discussed an alternative basis
for 10b-5 liability: because Chiarella had breached a duty to his
employer, the printer, and to the acquiring company, the
printer's client, there had been fraud sufficient to implicate
Section 10(b)." The Court refused to consider this theory be-
cause it had not been submitted to the jury,2 ' but it was
adopted by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent.'23 Thereafter,
many courts of appeal adopted the misappropriation theory,"
ahead of fund trades and Fidelity Investments policies prohibiting such trades);
Robert McGough, Few Mutual Funds Ban Personal Shorting, WALL ST. J., June 24,
1996, at C21 (describing the industry's proposed rules against personal trading).
119. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23; see also Laura Johannes, Newsletter Writer
Sturza is Told to Turn Over Trading Records, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1996 at C1
(reporting the SEC's investigation of an analyst following unusual trading patterns
in a stock he both owned and analyzed); William Power, Heard on the Street: Some
Analysts Own the Stocks They Tout, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1995, at C1 (discussing
investment and disclosure by analysts).
120. In a recent case, law enforcement officials interviewed employees of Cadence
Design Systems as part of an investigation into theft charges against Cadence's com-
petitor, Avant! Corp. The Cadence employees sold Avant! stock short, and the SEC
subsequently investigated them. See Michael Schroeder, SEC Probes Some Cadence
Employees Concerning Trading of Avant! Shares, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1997, at B12.
121. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980). This argument is
based on the language in Rule 10b-5 that prohibits fraud "upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
122. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236-37.
123. See id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990). But see United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618-19 (8th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting the misappropriation theory), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997);
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943-59 (4th Cir. 1995) (same), questioned in
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and the Supreme Court finally approved the theory in United
States v. O'Hagan.12
The original articulation of the theory by Chief Justice Burger
would have prohibited trading based on nonpublic information
whenever the trader obtained the information by unlawful means,
in other words, by misappropriation. 126 The theory rested on the
assumption that obtaining information unlawfully serves no use-
ful societal function and does not involve the foresight and skill
that the law of fraud seeks to protect.'27 Misappropriation thus
provides an "undue" advantage that should not be available in a
"fair" securities market.12 In the lower federal courts, the mis-
appropriation theory underwent some change. The theory was
applied generally only to information obtained in breach of a fidu-
ciary duty; ordinary theft might not count.2 9 This limitation
was based on the requirement, under Chiarella, that conduct
prohibited under Rule 10b-5 must be "fraudulent."30 Addition-
ally, the breach of fiduciary duty must have been committed for
personal gain; violating a confidence for altruistic purposes would
not give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability.''
The Supreme Court, in O'Hagan, recently adopted a version of
the misappropriation theory that reflects this evolution. The
Court stated that a trader "commits fraud 'in connection with' a
securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the
source of the information."32 The theory is premised on the
trader's "deception" of the owner of the information and the
trader's defrauding the owner of the exclusive use of the
information.' 3
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199.
125. 117 S. Ct. at 2199, 2213-14.
126. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 241.
128. See id.
129. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984); Cherif, 933 F.2d at 412
& n.6.
130. Materia, 745 F.2d at 201-02.
131. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
132. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
133. See id.
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The Court in O'Hagan had to deal with several problems
inherent in the misappropriation theory. First, the theory's reli-
ance on the broad "in connection with" language in Rule 10b-5
raises questions about the limits of the theory's application. Why
would a lawyer who embezzled from her client's trust account to
buy stock not be just as guilty of "fraud... in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security"' as one who, like Mr.
O'Hagan, made use of a client's takeover plans?'35 The Court
addressed this problem by limiting the scope of the "in connec-
tion with" language to acts of fraud that "ordinarily" derive their
value from securities trading.' Money has many uses, but in-
formation about a takeover is "ordinarily" only useful on the
stock market.'37 The Court rejected the dissent's argument
that takeover information might have other value,' but did
not consider that information other than takeover information
might be involved in a misappropriation case. The news of the
mineral strike in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,"39 for exam-
ple, would have been of enormous yalue to the owner of the sur-
rounding land or to anyone in a position to purchase that land
before the company did. It is hard to say that such information
ordinarily would have value only in the stock market. It will,
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
135. O'Hagan's firm represented Grand Metropolitan PLC in its effort to acquire
Pillsbury Company. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205. O'Hagan, who, by virtue of his
partnership in the firm, owed a duty to Grand Met, purchased Pillsbury stock and
options. See id. Although he did not owe a duty to Pillsbury, his use of the firm's
information allegedly violated a duty to the firm and to Grand Met. See id. at 2208.
Interestingly, O'Hagan also was convicted of theft and disbarred for misusing clients'
funds in a separate incident prior to the Grand Met matter. See In re Disciplinary
Action Against O'Hagan, 450 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 1990); State v. O'Hagan, 474
N.W.2d 613 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
136. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
137. See id; see also SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing
a similar limitation).
138. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. The dissent argued that a newspaper might
be willing to pay for the information. See id. at 2223 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). This case is discussed supra in notes 5-10 and
accompanying text.
140. A real-life example of this concerns the trade secrets investigation of Avant!
See supra note 120. The Cadence employees who learned of the investigation might
have used the information to tip off the targets of the investigation and help them
avoid prosecution. They might also, and allegedly did, conduct their own business so
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presumably, be left for the lower courts to determine the scope
of the misappropriation theory.
Another problem with the misappropriation theory is its reli-
ance, like Chiarella's, on underlying, poorly defined, state law
fraud. The Court in O'Hagan assumed that O'Hagan had com-
mitted fraud by using client information to trade securities, even
though the client was not damaged by that use.'4 Under the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, however, the use of confidential client infohmation is pro-
hibited only if such use is "to the disadvantage of the client."'
The older Model Code does not have such a limitation.4 3 A
lawyer who practices in a Model Code state, such as New York,
and buys securities based on a client's intentions may misappro-
priate information, although a lawyer in a Model Rules state,
such as Texas or Florida, may not.'" None of this would ap-
pear to have anything to do with the integrity of the securities
markets. Additionally, there is no reason why fraud, to use
Chiarella's term, should be limited to breach of fiduciary duty. A
material misrepresentation, for example, is fraud even where
there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties. Certain
breaches of fiduciary duties, however, are not generally thought
as to take advantage of their competitor's troubles. See Schroeder, supra note 120
(describing the civil suit by Avant! against Cadence for libel and unfair competition).
Similarly, in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1995), questioned
in United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), the defendant's acts involved
bid-rigging for the West Virginia video lottery machine contract. Bryan also bought
stock in the company whose bid he supported prior to the public announcement of
the contract award. See id. at 939. Bid-rigging is not a fraud ordinarily of value
only in the stock market. The SEC described his fraud, however, as trading on the
basis of confidential information, the identity of the "winning" bid, entrusted to him
in his capacity as lottery director. See id.
141. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208-09. It is not hard to imagine a scenario in
which the trades would harm the client-where the trading starts rumors or other-
wise results in an increase in the price of the targets stock-but there was no sug-
gestion that O'Hagan involved such a turn of events. See infra notes 251-53 and
accompanying text.
142. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(b) (1995).
143. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY DR 4-101(B)(3) (1983).
144. At the time of O'Hagan's trading, Minnesota was a Model Rules state. See 52
MINN. STAT. ANN. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(b) (West 1993) (effective 1985).
O'Hagan's use of the information may have violated a duty to his partners regard-
less of whether it violated a duty to the client.
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of as fraud: a breach of the fiduciary's duty of care, for example,
or disclosure of confidential information that does not result in
gain to the fiduciary."5 The SEC's and the federal courts' con-
tinuing focus on breaches of fiduciary duty seems a bit unwar-
ranted and perhaps results from the lingering effect of
Chiarella's fiduciary trading rule.
The Court also noted that if a fiduciary discloses her inten-
tions to use the information, there is no breach of duty.46 If
O'Hagan had notified his partners and his client of his trading
plans, then he would not have violated the securities laws.' 7
If, as the Court frequently stated in O'Hagan, the purpose of
Rule 10b-5 is to protect the integrity of the securities mar-
kets,'48 then it is difficult to see why O'Hagan's disclosure to
nonmarket participants should matter. Additionally, this facet of
the misappropriation theory puts the SEC in the interesting
position of protecting not buyers and sellers of securities or even
the market generally, but attorneys' clients and other beneficia-
ries of fiduciary relationships. 49
Commentators have raised objections to the misappropriation
theory since it began to gain currency in the 1980s; 0 it is not
145. The Court in O'Hagan recognized this when it referred to Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, a former employee disclosed corporate wrongdoing to an
analyst, and the Court held that, because the employee had not "acted for personal
profit," there was no 10b-5 violation. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213. The Court
also stated, however, that "[n]o showing had been made in Dirks that the tippers
had violated any duty . . . ." Id. It is at least arguable that the employees did, in
fact, violate a duty by disclosing the wrongdoing as they did. What the Court ap-
pears to have meant is that Rule 10b-5 is limited to breaches of a fiduciary's duty
of loyalty.
146. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209.
147. See id. This part of the rule is relevant to the practice of "warehousing," in
which a soon-to-be-bidder notifies friendly parties of its intentions so that they may
purchase the targets stock at prebid prices. Under the misappropriation theory,
warehousing is permitted because it is fully disclosed to the "owner" of the informa-
tion, the bidder. The SEC takes the position that warehousing violates Rule 14e-3,
which does not require a breach of a disclosure duty. See id. at 2215-16. The Court
in O'Hagan left that question open. See id. at 2217 n.17.
148. See id. at 2207, 2210.
149. See id. at 2208, 2211. The misappropriation theory will raise further questions
if it is used to provide a basis for private causes of action by "defrauded" traders.
See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. The Court carefully limited its ap-
proval of the misappropriation theory to criminal cases. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at
2214.
150. See, e.g., David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading: The Demise of the Mis-
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to be expected that those objections will disappear now that the
Supreme Court has given the theory its imprimatur. The theory
has one huge advantage, however, that probably explains its
popularity better than the carefully justified reasoning of the
courts: It eliminates one of the absurdities of the old fiduciary
trading rule, which treats those, like Chiarella, with takeover
information derived from a bidder, differently from those with
information derived from a target. 5' In other words, O'Hagan
was necessary to repair the damage done by Chiarella, but it
unfortunately is almost as unsatisfactory.'52
The federal courts and the academic community will have to
continue their struggle to find an acceptable definition for insid-
er trading that will include the appropriate noninsiders. 5' At
one extreme is the position supported by language in Cady,
Roberts that anyone with superior information has a duty to
disclose or abstain-the "parity-of-information" rule."5  That
rule is believed generally to be unworkable because with per-
appropriation Theory-and Thereafter, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 625 (1997); Jill E. Fisch,
Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26
GA. L. REV. 179, 204-08 (1991); Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided
Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory
of Section 10(B), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139 (1995); Richard M. Phillips & Robert J. Zutz,
The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65,
90-93 (1984); Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriations Theory of Insider Trading: A
Legal, Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 223, 233-53
(1992).
151. The Court in O'Hagan summed up with that observation. See O'Hagan, 117 S.
Ct. at 2210-11. Although insiders at the target are not likely to have advance infor-
mation about hostile bids, they will often have knowledge of pending negotiated
transactions.
152. One interesting feature of the Court's opinion in O'Hagan is its repeated refer-
ences to the need for "fair" securities markets and to the public's interest in prohib-
iting the unfair, "no-risk" profits O'Hagan made because of his inside information.
See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207-08, 2209-10, & 2210-11. This emphasis might be
read to call into question the Court's position in Chiarella, in which the Court ex-
pressly rejected the lower court's argument that "[tihe use by anyone of material
information not generally available is fraudulent because such information gives cer-
tain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers."
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 222 (1980).
153. I have omitted a discussion of "tippee" liability as outside the scope of this
Article. The Supreme Court has recognized that a trader who trades on information
from a tipper, who has breached a duty by making the tip, has violated Rule 10b-5.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
154. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
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fectly equal information, no trades would ever occur. At the
other extreme is the old regime of caveat emptor, under which
only outright lies are prohibited.155 That rule generally is be-
lieved to be undesirable because it would reduce public confi-
dence in, and willingness to participate in, the securities mar-
kets, and because it is "unfair."55 I turn now to a discussion of
the wide variety of concepts jurists have considered in attempt-
ing to formulate a workable rule. 5 '
II. THE CHARAcTERIsTIcs OF AN IDEAL TRADING RULE
The search for a legal definition of prohibited trading by those
with special knowledge ("fraud by silence") covers the ground
between two end positions. At one extreme is the parity-of-infor-
mation approach, which some have accused the SEC of advocat-
155. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
156. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1934)); id. at 2210 (de-
scribing the need for fair securities markets); H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, at 5 (1983)
("The abuse of informational advantages that other investors cannot hope to over-
come through their own efforts is unfair and inconsistent with the investing public's
legitimate expectation of honest and fair securities markets where all participants
play by the same rules."); see also 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 3451-54
(describing the "integrity of the market theory"). Other sources advocating fair insid-
er trading rules include Parker M. Nielson, So What Else is New in the Law? Texas
Gulf Sulphur Restates Peek v. Gurney, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 327, 343; Scheppele,
supra note 20, at 125; Ellen Virginia Hines, Comment, New Concept of Fraud on the
Securities Exchange-a Comment on In Re Cady, Roberts & Co., 15 S.C. L. REv.
557, 560 (1963). For a criticism of "fairness" as a legal concept, see Easterbrook,
supra note 16, at 323-30.
157. It is worth noting here that the state common law has not stood still since
1934. Several states have recognized a caui of action by the corporation, or by
shareholders derivatively, against insider traders based on the secret profit doctrine
of agency law. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. Ch. 1949);
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969); 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note
4, at 3477-84; Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1223-27. But see Freeman v. Decio, 584
F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1978). If the insider (an agent) profits from knowledge she
received in the course of employment, then her profits belong to the company (the
principal) and can be recovered in an accounting. In most states, the corporation
need not prove damage. If agency law can effectively discourage insider trading, then
it may make Rule 10b-5 liability unnecessary. Because the recovery in such an ac-
tion goes to the corporation, however, there is no incentive for private litigants and
their lawyers to bring such actions, which may explain the scarcity of secret profit
insider trading cases. In any event, because the secret profit rule has a separate
doctrinal and theoretical basis from Rule 10b-5 liability, it is not relevant to the
analysis in this Article.
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ing."55 That approach would prohibit any transaction in which
the parties have unequal information, thus placing a duty to
disclose on all the world.'59 The problem with such a rule is ob-
vious: Trades of any good occur only because the parties have
different views of the value of the good. If the parties are ratio-
nal, then their different views must be based on the information
each has, and requiring each party to disclose all relevant infor-
mation would eliminate the incentive to trade. 60 This fact of
economic life perhaps needs no citation, but it is worth noting
that it is neither new nor confined to the stock market.'
6
'
Furthermore, public policy favors rewarding diligence, sagaci-
ty, and foresight. As an early nineteenth century commentator
put it:
My knowledge of the articles in which I traffic, and of the
circumstances which influence the fluctuations of their mar-
ket price, forms the most valuable and perhaps the most
costly part of my capital. Why then are not the profits which
I may make by using them as much my own, as the interest
of my money or the rents of my houses? ... Moreover, does
not public policy agree with common sense, in allowing the
skillful and industrious the full enjoyment of that necessary
superiority over their competitors, which well directed indus-
try must always give?"
Courts and commentators alike have recognized the law's con-
cern for rewarding effort and skill. The common law insider
trading cases recognized that "[iut is not the intent of the law to
place a restraint on the affairs of business, when conducted
fairly, honestly and openly, nor to deprive one party to a con-
158. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 252 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 8.
160. This analysis treats things such as each party's aversion to risk and other
personal preferences and characteristics as "information."
161. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 10, at 80; 1 STORY, supra note 33, at 215 ("the
rule must be drawn, so as not to affect the general transactions of mankind");
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 327-28; Caveat Emptor-The Rule of the Common
Law-Not of the Civil Law, 12 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 94, 97 (1834) [hereinafter
Caveat Emptorl.
162. VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 9; see 1 STORY, supra note 33, at 215.
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tract of the advantage which superior judgment, greater skill, or
better information may give."" Additionally, the law has al-
ways had little patience with plaintiffs who are foolish or over-
cautious and later seek to recover from wiser parties.' The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: "If the other [party] is
indolent, inexperienced or ignorant, or if his judgment is bad or
he lacks access to adequate information, his adversary is not
generally expected to compensate for these deficiencies." 6 ' As
a matter of fraud law generally, the law does not relieve one
from an "unwise, careless or improvident bargain."'6 To the
extent that insider trading prohibitions rely on the assumption
that insiders are more sophisticated and perhaps less honest
than their trading opposites, they fail to recognize that "trading
is full of human nature, a stock trade no less than a horse trade.
Buyers and sellers alike may be crafty, and more than one seller
has been known to be a welsher."6 '
If the parity-of-information approach is not acceptable, then
neither, it seems, is the other extreme, a rule that would permit
all trading based on secret information, except, presumably, for
cases involving traditional fiduciary relationships, such as trust-
ees, guardians, etc. Unlike the parity-of-information approach,
this caveat emptor position has had adherents over the years.'68
The most frequently cited judicial pronouncement of caveat emp-
tor occurred in Laidlaw v. Organ.'69 Laidlaw involved a pur-
163. Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 281 (Kan. 1904); see also Oliver v. Oliver, 45
S.E. 232, 233 (Ga. 1903) (stating that courts "cannot put parties upon an equality
which does not in fact exist. They cannot deprive one of the advantage which supe-
rior judgment, greater skill, or wider information may give.").
164. See Woodruff v. Cole, 269 S.W. 599, 604 (Mo. 1925) ("Appellant could judge of
what might happen as well as others"); Grant v. Attrill, 11 F. 469, 470
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) ("The [plaintiff] seems to have preferred to sell rather than risk
the management promised; and he sold out"); Dalley, supra note 10, at 419-21.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cint. d (1979); see FRIED, supra
note 10, at 82-83.
166. Caveat Emptor, supra note 161, at 100.
167. Walker, supra note 64, at 637, 640.
168. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 117. Manne does not specifically oppose insider
trading regulation; rather, he proposes an alternative mode of analysis that others
have interpreted as rejecting regulation of most insider trading. See generally Caveat
Emptor, supra note 161, passim; Walker, supra note 64, passim.
169. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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chase of tobacco by a buyer who knew about the Treaty of
Ghent 7 ' from a seller who did not. Chief Justice Marshall's
brief opinion, holding that the buyer "was not bound to communi-
cate [the news]," stirred up considerable controversy.''
The basis for much of the criticism of Laidlaw was its failure
to recognize common standards of morality.
However correct this judicial decision may have been in point
of law, and however strongly the expediency of the law, as
laid down, may seem to be recommended by considerations of
public policy and the necessities of trade, yet I believe, most
of those who, without much speculation or deliberate reason-
ing, form their moral judgments from their unstudied impres-
sions of right and wrong, will find it somewhat revolting to
their notions of sound morality. 2
Others have argued, however, that although ordinary people
might criticize the buyer in Laidlaw as unethical, they would do
the same themselves given the opportunity.' More fundamen-
tally, the problem with morality as a guiding principle is that
there is no necessary connection between law and morality. Some
have argued that law, where practicable, should mirror morality
because a perceived divergence between law and morality causes
law to lose its legitimacy with the public. 74 Yet, where estab-
lished law clearly is opposed to common notions of morality, or
where policy dictates that it be so opposed, morality loses. 75
Moral arguments have also been raised in the context of insid-
er trading.7 ' Pre-1934 courts finding in favor of plaintiffs
170. The Treaty of Ghent ended the War of 1812 and caused tobacco prices to rise
sharply. See id. at 181.
171. See Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 195. The opinion actually did not espouse a true
caveat emptor position because it was limited to cases in which "each party...
take[s] care not to say or do any thing tending to impose upon the other." Id. The
case was remanded to the trial court. For an analysis of Laidlaw based on modem
economic concepts, see 7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 3467-69.
172. VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 5; cf 1 STORY, supra note 33, § 194, at 20304
(noting the divergence between law and morality).
173. See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1241-42; Keeton, supra note 37, at 32.
174. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 155-74; Allen, supra note 108, at 176.
175. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 147-48, 159.
176. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 25, at 226.
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sometimes cited morality as a basis for their decisions," but
more often courts noted the immorality of the defendants' acts,
but nevertheless rejected the plaintiffs' claims.'78 Although
moral concerns are mentioned rarely by post-1934 commenta-
tors, the morality of insider trading is probably still open to
question. 9 At least one court of appeals has argued that the
securities acts were intended to achieve high standards of busi-
ness ethics in the securities industry.8 '
Another support for a full disclosure rule, at least in the nine-
teenth century, was the authority of the civil law. According to
some sources, the civil law recognized fraud by silence and thus
required parties to disclose all relevant information. 8' Most
There is no great disagreement about the ethics of the [insider trading]
transaction. Managements engaged in this kind of business do not enjoy
having it divulged. And when business men dislike to have their methods
disclosed, even after the fact, it is usually sound to conclude that their
ethical judgment is against it.
Id. See MANNE, supra note 117, at 15 (admitting that moral standards "play an im-
portant role" in the business community); Hines, supra note 156, at 558-60 (discuss-
ing ethics and fairness); Laylin, supra note 52, at 732 n.6; Wilgus, supra note 52i at
297; see also infra notes 266-85 and accompanying text, for a discussion of argu-
ments related to "fairness."
177. See, e.g., Morrison v. Snow, 72 P. 924, 928 (Utah 1903).
178. See, e.g., Boulden v. Stilwell, 60 A. 609, 610 (Md. 1905); Grant v. Attrill, 11
F. 469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); cf Crowell v. Jackson, 23 A. 426, 427 (N.J. 1891)
("there can be no fraud without moral delinquency"). The increasing influence of pro-
gressive legal thought during this period presumably accounts for jurists' changing
attitudes toward morality and law. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 4-8
(William W. Fisher, III et al. eds. 1993) (discussing forerunners to Realists such as
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes); HORWITZ, supra note 59, at 113-16 (discussing views
of the role of morality in tort law).
179. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 105-17, for a discussion of the
moral arguments for and against insider trading. Morality is not completely absent
from contemporary legal analysis. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE LAW 238-40 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that there is no fundamental inconsisten-
cy between morality and economic efficiency).
180. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1981).
181. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 178, 185 et seq. (1817) (citing
Pothier); 1 STORY, supra note 33, § 204, at 213-14 (citing Cicero); VERPLANCK, supra
note 26, at 60-63 (discussing, at length, the beauty of Roman law); Keeton, supra
note 37, at 23 n.55 (citing Cicero and others). The citation of civil law sources by
commentators in the nineteenth century may represent a general fondness for the
civil law among American jurists at that time. See M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry:
Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 95, 112 et seq.
(1986).
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commentators noted, however, that the civil law rule in its pur-
est form-the parity-of-information rule-was inappropriate for
a commercial society,'8' but was "suited to the less complicated
dealings of a people without much trade, and, as in fact it was,
to a people who despised commerce."'
A third argument against a strict caveat emptor regime is its
effect on the integrity of markets. Commentators often express
fears that an "every man for himself' approach would discourage
people from participating in commerce.'" Additionally, in the
stock market context, the early disclosure of information, which
a disclose-or-abstain rule would encourage, is a positive good
because it facilitates rational investment decisions.'85 The
investor confidence argument has been rejected vehemently by
law and economics scholars, among others, who note that there
is no empirical evidence that insider trading affects the rate of
market participation.'88
It is worth noting one other argument in favor of the caveat
emptor approach to insider trading: insider trading provides
compensation for corporate officers and, especially, directors who
would not undertake the risks of service without such an incen-
tive."'87 Several objections to that argument have been identi-
fied, including the haphazard nature of such compensation and
the incentives it gives managers to delay disclosure and adopt
182. See 1 STORY, supra note 33, § 205, at 214-15; VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at
71-75; see also Caveat Emptor, supra note 161, at 101, 103, 104 (criticizing sharply
the civil law).
183. Caveat Emptor, supra note 161, at 95.
184. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 10, at 83; MANNE, supra note 117, at 15 ("[Uinless
there is broad-based agreement on various standards of ethical conduct, free markets
do not seem to function very effectively."); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at
29-32; Berle, supra note 52, at 830; Wilgus, supra note 52, at 287; Nielson, supra
note 156, at 350. But see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 296-97.
185. See, e.g., Brudney supra note 11, at 334. But see EASTERBROOK & FIScHEL, su-
pra note 109, at 299 (arguing that more information is only good if it is worth more
than it costs to produce).
186. See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 325-26.
187. The most cited source for this argument is MANNE, supra note 117, at 131-45,
although there are other sources. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 25, at 225
n.6; cf Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) ("Fiduciary obligations of
directors ought not to be made so onerous that men of experience and ability will be
deterred from accepting such office."); Wilgus, supra note 52, at 297 (criticizing the
argument).
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policies fostering volatility in stock price.'
Because most commentators have rejected both the parity-of-
information and the caveat emptor positions, they have been
forced to search for a principled means of distinguishing be-
tween fraud by silence and acceptable market behavior. Those
distinctions are discussed below.
A. Types of Information
Through the years, commentators, although oddly not courts,
have drawn distinctions based on the type of information with-
held. To the extent generalization is possible, the rules proposed
would treat the withholding of intrinsic or company information
as fraud by silence, but the withholding of extrinsic, market, or
personal information as acceptable market behavior. As ex-
plained below, these categories are quite fluid and contain nu-
merous exceptions; therefore, it is surprising to find them peren-
nially featured in the literature.
1. Intrinsic v. Extrinsic Information.
Nineteenth century commentators often discussed the differ-
ence between intrinsic information, which directly pertains to
the item in question, and extrinsic information, which pertains
to the environment in which the sale occurs. 89 The news of the
Treaty of Ghent in Laidlaw v. Organ was thus extrinsic infor-
mation, and Justice Marshall so described it, albeit without
discussion."s The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction seems to have
come from the Roman law, but Roman law, according to Ameri-
can commentators, applied the same rule to both types of infor-
mation. 9' Similarly, the commentators' description of the law
relating to intrinsic information, on the one hand, and extrinsic
188. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 11, at 345 n.78 (citing sources advocating this
position); Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 332-33.
189. See 1 STORY, supra note 33, §§ 210-13, at 219-21; WILLIAM W. STORY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 179, 167-68 (4th ed.
1871); Keeton, supra note 37, at 20, 35.
190. See 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817).
191. See 1 STORY, supra note 33, § 211, at 220-21; VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at
63-68.
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information, on the other, often did not sound any different. Jo-
seph Story thus noted that under the common law, the rule of
caveat emptor applied to extrinsic facts, whereas for intrinsic
facts, the rule is caveat emptor unless there are special circum-
stances or a special relationship between the parties.'92 Simi-
larly, William W. Story wrote:
In respect to extrinsic circumstances, the rule is ... that no
mere concealment in respect thereto constitutes such a fraud
as to nullify the contract [unless the defendant's acts amount
to active concealment or prevention of discovery of the
facts] . . But in respect to intrinsic qualities, the rule is
different; and in such cases, mere concealment will, under
certain circumstances, constitute a fraud... , although, ordi-
narily, the maxim of caveat emptor also applies. 9 '
Story then described those "certain circumstances" in terms
rather similar to the exceptions applicable to extrinsic facts.'
Gulian Verplanck, who wrote a long essay on fraud by silence in
1825, carefully described the difference between intrinsic and
extrinsic facts, but stated that they should be treated the same
as long as they are material.195
To the extent that there was a difference in the law between
extrinsic and intrinsic information, it probably related to a gen-
eral view that extrinsic information about the trading environ-
ment-market forces, wars, political events, tariffs-is theoreti-
cally available to any person, whereas information specific to an
item is usually available only to its owner.9 6 As discussed be-
low, this rationale would apply somewhat differently in the secu-
rities markets, because of the unusual position of existing share-
holders as owners of the company in question and because of the
required disclosure of company information.
192. See 1 STORY, supra note 33, §§ 212-13, at 221; see also 2 KENT, supra note
34, at 377 ("There may be some difference in the facility with which the rule applies
between facts and circumstances that are intrinsic ... and those that are extrin-
sic . . . ").
193. 1 STORY, supra note 33, § 179, at 167-68.
194. Id.
195. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 227-28.
196. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
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2. Market v. Company Information.
In the insider trading context, the vocabulary of the intrin-
sic/extrinsic distinction is changed to that of company informa-
tion, which relates directly to the issuer of the stock in question
(such as a drop in earnings or a research breakthrough), and
market information, which relates to market forces generally
(such as a change in Federal Reserve policy or "bullish" senti-
ment among traders).'97 Again, however, the distinction is only
helpful up to a point. It seems clear that a corporation would not
have an obligation to disclose advance notice of a war in Eu-
rope,'98 but other market information is more problematic. The
Supreme Court in Chiarella, for example, noted that the infor-
mation upon which Chiarella traded was market information be-
cause it concerned market demand for the stock rather than the
business prospects of the target company.'99 Other commenta-
tors have argued persuasively that a distinction between compa-
ny and market information has no basis in the language or in-
tent of the securities laws.00
Presumably, the legal distinction between market and compa-
ny information is intended to produce some policy-based differ-
ence in the cases. One proposed rationale for the distinction
notes that company information generally is produced for a
business purpose and has usefulness beyond predicting fluctua-
tions in stock price. Company information therefore generally
will be produced even if its producers are not permitted to profit
from the information by stock transactions.20 ' Much market
information, however, is also produced for nonstock purposes.
Information about a takeover bid is produced because the bidder
197. Cf VERPLANCI, supra note 26, at 112-13 (discussing how external circum-
stances and the common and ordinary quality of the thing being sold affects the
price of the thing being sold).
198. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 25, at 323.
199. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980).
200. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 11, at 329-33 (noting that some of the specific
abuses, such as pools generating artificial demand for stocks, that the securities acts
were intended to correct involved market information), cited in Chiarella, 445 U.S.
at 341 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
201. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 356. Many commentators are concerned that,
without the incentive of profit on the stock market, market participants will not
produce information. See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 313-14, 338-39.
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must effectuate its bid. Chiarella had access to information be-
cause the bidder had to print offering materials, not because he
conducted careful research in the industry.
The real reason why the market/company distinction seems
relevant is that analysts' information is vital to the functioning
of the stock market, and any acceptable insider trading rule
must continue to provide incentives for analysts to generate
information. Analysts' information will not necessarily be mar-
ket information, however, and it often will not be nonpublic. An
analyst who examines publicly available information about an
industry, who talks to executives and visits facilities and who
then produces a report based on that research has not generated
inside information. All the information the analyst used is pub-
licly available, and the interpretation that a market participant
places upon publicly-available information is not inside informa-
tion by any reasonable definition." 2 But if the analyst trades
on the information, then he or she has done nothing more than
profit by his or her research and analytical skills. The analyst's
clients have done nothing more than hire an agent to do their
research and analysis for them. Additionally, if an executive
gives an analyst preferential access to information,'" the exec-
utive or the company may have violated the disclosure provi-
sions of the securities acts or stock exchange rules,"4 or the
access may, in extreme cases, amount to "tipping," placing the
analyst in the same position with respect to the information as
the insider who "tipped."2 5 There is no reason to tailor insider
trading regulation to specially deal with the analyst problem.
202. It may be proprietary, and the analyst may be able to restrict access to the
information. See infra notes 258-61, 264, and accompanying text. It is not
"nonpublic" because anyone who bothered could produce the information just as the
analyst had done.
203. See Vanessa O'Connell & Dave Kansas, Shut Out: Bank of New York Scruti-
nized Over Delay in Announcing Big Reserve, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1996, at Cl;
Randall Smith, Conference Calls to Big Investors Often Leave Little Guys Hung Up,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at C1.
204. See generally Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act
Release No. 7101, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,436, at
85,787-88 (Oct. 13, 1994) (discussing "Entanglement and Endorsement" in the ana-
lyst-corporation relationship).
205. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230, n.12 (1980).
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A company/market distinction also leaves unaddressed the
problem of "scalpers" because it always involves market informa-
tion."6 If a scalper trades because she is aware of the content
of the recommendation, then she is trading on nonpublic market
information, and a market/company distinction would allow her
to trade."' If, however, the scalper writes the column because
she owns the stock and wishes to cause the price to rise, then
she may be guilty of market manipulation, but cannot be said to
have engaged in insider trading.0 8
Finally, unlike the common law intrinsic/extrinsic distinction,
the company/market distinction does not make sense based on
insiders' access to information. Company information may relate
to more than one company. A research breakthrough by Compa-
ny A, for example, may affect the business prospects of Company
B, one of Company A's competitors. The information will be
company information in both cases, but there is no reason to
assume that Company B's managers will have access to the
information earlier than anyone else. Market information, how-
ever, will often be accessible only to those planning the event,
such as the bidder in a takeover attempt or governmental em-
ployees in the case of regulatory activity.
3. General v. Personal Information.
One other distinction that, although useful, receives little
attention in the commentaries is the distinction between general
206. See discussion supra note 118.
207. It may be that scalping is an acceptable market practice that should be per-
mitted under the securities laws. See generally Brudney, supra note 11, at 368-71
(discussing scalping and its legal implications). Professor Brudney noted that, to the
extent scalping acts as a fraud on the readers of the advice in question, it is ad-
dressed by fiduciary law. See id at 369. A related question concerns whether mutual
fund managers should be permitted to trade based on their knowledge of fund activi-
ty. Some, but not all, fund companies prohibit such practices. See supra note 118.
When managers trade against their funds (i.e., selling when the fund is buying or
vice versa), different issues are present. See Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Action is Unlikely
on Vinik, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1996, at C1.
208. Generally, publications either require their columnists to disclose their posi-
tions in any securities mentioned in the column or publish blanket disclaimers warn-
ing readers that columnists may hold such positions. See supra notes 118-19 and
accompanying text.
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and personal information."9 Personal information consists only
of information that relates to one's own attitudes, expectations,
or intentions. All other information, including information about
others' attitudes, is general. In the paradigmatic horse trade,
therefore, the fact that the horse has a disease is intrinsic infor-
mation, the fact that the Union Army's advance has created an
increase in the demand for horses is extrinsic market informa-
tion, but the fact that the seller is planning to leave town and
will sell at any price is the seller's personal information. Howev-
er fraud by silence is defined, it cannot include a duty to disclose
personal information, absent a close fiduciary relationship of
some kind.210
A rule that excludes personal information from insider trading
or fraud by silence solves several problems. It explains, for ex-
ample, why analysts or other sophisticated parties are permitted
to trade based on the results of their analysis and research,21'
and it explains why a bidder planning to launch a takeover may
acquire shares of the target prior to the announcement of the
bid.2"2 This rule might be construed to allow scalping, because
it involves the columnist's personal decision to print, and ad-
vance trading by mutual fund managers, because it is based on
their intentions for the fund. Yet, because scalpers and fund
managers have duties to their clients-their readers or the
fund's investors-their trading may be prohibited on other
grounds. A personal information rule would have to consider
whether, or when, to allow those with personal information to
delegate their trading activity to agents. As Verplanck writes,
when the seller of a horse who will take any price sends an
agent to make the sale, the agent is under no more duty to dis-
close the seller's intention than the seller would be.213 Similar-
ly, before the adoption of Rule 14e-3 under the 1934 Act, tender
offerors regularly employed warehousers to acquire stock before
209. For a rare discussion of such information, see VERPLANCI, supra note 26, at
113, 119-20; Brudney, supra note 11, at 361-62.
210. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 113, 119-20; Brudney, supra note 11, at
361-62.
211. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 361-62.
212. See id. at 371-76 (discussing tender offers).
213. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 78.
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the announcement of the bid.214 There would appear to be no
reason to forbid the use of agents in transactions based on per-
sonal information; if the information is "personal" to a party,
then it will also be "personal" to her agent.21
B. Means of Discovery
Commentators searching for a definition of fraud by silence
have long focused on the means by which the trader acquired
the information. Distinctions based on the means of discovery
have an apparent advantage in that they address the policy
concerns inherent in any fraud-by-silence rule.
1. Effort v. Theft or Accident
Because one of the goals of the law is to encourage and re-
ward both diligence and the production of information, a rule
that distinguishes between information acquired by, lawful effort
and information acquired by theft or accident makes a great
deal of sense. This is one of the main advantages of the so-called
misappropriation theory discussed above, which precludes the
use of information acquired by theft.1 6 Were it not so difficult
to administer, a rule might be drawn that specifically defines
fraud by silence as the withholding of all information acquired
"casually" or accidentally rather than "deliberately." As Pro-
fessor Keeton wrote in 1936, "any time information is acquired
by an illegal act it would seem that there should be a duty to
disclose that information, irrespective of the nature of the reme-
dy."1 ' Keeton also included information gained through merely
tortious actions, such as trespass to land, and information ac-
quired by "mere chance" in this category.21 9
214. For a discussion of this practice and the rule, see Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980); Brudney, supra note 11, at 371-76.
215. This simply follows general agency principles. Cf Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
655 n.14 (1983) (treating some agents, such as the issuer's lawyers and accountants,
as temporary insiders for Rule 10b-5 purposes).
216. See supra notes 121-52 and accompanying text.
217. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 342 n.69; Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Dis-
closure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-17 (1978).
218. Keeton, supra note 37, at 25-26; see id. at 35.
219. See iL at 26. It often seems to be the case, however, that distinctions drawn
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2. The Misappropriation Theory and its Relatives
The "misappropriation theory" has been popular with courts
and commentators alike as a way of expanding Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity beyond corporate insiders and, because it recently received
the approval of the Supreme Court, it is likely to be the leading
theory of 10b-5 liability for the foreseeable future. Needless to
say, perhaps, the misappropriation theory rests on the means of
discovery distinction. As discussed above, however, there are
problems with the misappropriation theory. For one thing, the
remedy does not match the wrong: the civil penalty for violating
Rule 10b-5 is based on the trader's profits, or losses avoided,22 °
and persons who traded in the market during the same time
period as the insider trader may recover the trader's profits." 1
The "defrauded" party-the party whose information was misap-
propriated-does not have a private cause of action under the
securities laws, and that party's damages are not considered in
the civil penalties under the 1934 Act.222 In fact, the owner of
the information may have a state law cause of action against the
trader,223 but such an action would not implicate the securities
laws because only buyers and sellers have the right to sue for
securities act violations.2 4
Additionally; the misappropriation theory seems overly broad.
As discussed above,2" to the extent the misappropriation theory
rests on the language of the 1934 Act and Rule that refers to de-
ceptive practices, no statutory basis exists for limiting the theory
on the basis of the means by which the trader acquired her information are motivat-
ed primarily by another fact, that the other party to the transaction could not have
discovered the information himself. In the case Keeton cited for his proposition, the
holding rested not only on the fact that the information was acquired by theft, but
also on the fact that the information was unavailable to the plaintiffs. See Phillips
v. Homfray, 6 L.R.-Ch. 770 (1871), cited in Keeton, supra note 37, at 25.
220. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2)
(1994).
221. See § 20A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b). The Supreme Court has limited its ap-
proval of the misappropriation theory to criminal cases. See United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214 (1997).
222. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 270-71.
223. See infra note 255 and accompanying text (discussing cause of action for secret
profits).
224. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
225. See supra notes 121-52 and accompanying text.
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to misuse of information on the stock market.22 Why would a
trustee who embezzles from his trust and uses the proceeds to
invest in the stock market not be just as guilty of having engaged
in a "deceptive device... in connection with the purchase and sale
of securities" as the former employee who breaks into his old office
to obtain information about a pending merger?227
The misappropriation theory, like the effort/theft distinction
generally, has an advantage over other approaches on policy
grounds. One policy concern is that regulation of fraud by si-
lence should not discourage the production of useful informa-
tion. 8 An insider trading prohibition based on the misappro-
priation theory would not implicate this concern because those
who misappropriate information do not serve any useful societal
function. The misappropriation theory's purported basis in the
language of Rule 10b-5, therefore, is probably no more than a
linguistic sleight-of-hand to create the favored rule. Outside of
the context of the 1934 Act, a definition of fraud by silence based
on misappropriation would run into the apparently intractable
remedy problem. To give the ignorant trader a cause of action
based on the knowledgeable trader's commission of a tort
against a complete stranger to the plaintiff is unthinkable in a
world that still recognizes concepts of privity. The misappropria-
tion theory's utility is therefore probably limited to cases involv-
ing stock transactions.
3. Monopoly v. Equal Access to Information
The recent popularity of the misappropriation theory notwith-
standing, the most enduring distinction made by jurists consid-
ering fraud by silence is the distinction between information
available to all parties who bother to look and information avail-
able only to certain persons. The arguments appear as early as
226. Burger recognized this. See Chiarella v. United States 445 U.S. 222, 240
(1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
227. The latter example is drawn from SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.
1991). But see U.S. v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997) (rejecting the argument
that embezzlement could be a basis for a Rule 10b-5 claim under the misappropria-
tion theory).
228. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 259-60.
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Laidlaw v. Organ,229 in which both sides relied on the distinc-
tion. The plaintiffs lawyer argued that those who first received
the news of the treaty deliberately "monopolized" the informa-
tion and withheld it until after the completion of the tobacco
purchase." ° The defendant's lawyer argued that "[t]here
was.., no circumvention or manoeuvre practised by the vendee,
unless rising earlier in the morning, and obtaining by superior
diligence and alertness that intelligence by which the price of
commodities was regulated, be such." " Chief Justice Marshall
treated the case as one in which "the intelligence.., was exclu-
sively within the knowledge of the vendee," but found for the
defendant nevertheless because "[it would be difficult to circum-
scribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the
means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties." 2
Despite the rather unequivocal language in Laidlaw, commen-
tators continued to argue for a rule requiring disclosure where
the parties did not have equal access to the information in ques-
tion. Chancellor Kent, writing ten years later, cited Laidlaw for
the proposition that disclosure is not required "[when... the
means of information.., be equally accessible to both par-
ties."23 Other sources argued for a related doctrine that, where
inspection was available, defects that an inspection would have
disclosed could not give rise to a fraud claim, even when the
buyer failed to inspect. 4 As Professor Keeton pointed out and
as Laidlaw illustrated, however, the equal access rule was of
limited usefulness." 5 Although there was never a duty to dis-
close information available to all, there was not always a duty to
disclose information not available to all."
The equal access rule also appeared in the common law insid-
229. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 178 (1817).
230. See id. at 194.
231. Id. at 193.
232. Id. at 195.
233. 2 KENT, supra note 34, at 380.
234. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 165 (1768) (explaining that there
is no duty to disclose things plain to the eyes of all); Brudney, supra note 11, at
355 n.110; Caveat Emptor, supra note 161, at 99; Dalley, supra note 10, at 419-24.
235. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text; supra notes 229-32 and accom-
panying text.
236. See Keeton, supra note 37, at 30.
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er trading cases. In the very early case of Spence v.
Whitaker," the court based liability on the fact that the
defendant's "situation must have given him an intimate knowl-
edge of the state and condition of the affairs of the company[;]
that no other could have any satisfactory knowledge concerning
them, unless derived through him."" Additionally, the concern
for equal access probably led to the turn-of-the-century rule that
there was no duty to disclose information reflected in the
company's books, but that information not so available, such as
merger negotiations, must be disclosed. 9
The* equal access theory also has played a significant role in
the post-1934 insider-trading debate. One leading commentator
has proposed a rule that would permit trading only on the basis
of informational advantages that other traders were able to
erode.o In other words, if the public does not have lawful ac-
cess to information, then a trader who does have such access
violates Rule 10b-5 if she trades on the basis of the
information.2" Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Chiarella,
made a similar proposal." Justice Blackmun thought that it
was the trader's special access to information, rather than the
existence of a breach of duty, that gave rise to the 10b-5 viola-
tion. 3 Even if the print shop and its client, the bidder, had
237. 3 Port. 297 (Ala. 1836).
238. Id. at 324. In addition, in that case the plaintiffs lack of knowledge was due
to the defendant's failure to keep accurate records. See id.; see also Jacquith v. Ma-
son, 156 N.W. 1041 (Neb. 1916) (noting that the plaintiff "was not familiar with
public transactions, was wholly unacquainted with the condition of the corporation,
the value of the stock, or the opportunity to sell the same."); Morrison v. Snow, 72
P. 924, 928 (Utah 1903) (determining 'that the plaintiff did not have equal access
because his job kept him tied to a distant city).
239. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (Ga. 1903); Walsh v. Goulden, 90
N.W. 406, 410 (Mich. 1902); Heinselman, supra note 52, at 629-30; see also Steinfeld
v. Nielsen, 139 P. 879, 888 (Ariz. 1913) (discussing a situation in which the plaintiff
was also a director); Boulden v. Stilwell, 60 A. 609, 612 (Md. 1905) (same). But see
Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 281 (Kan. 1904) (holding that the fact that the plain-
tiff could have examined the books is irrelevant); Woodruff v. Cole, 269 S.W. 599,
601, 604 (Mo. 1925) (same).
240. See Brudney, supra note 11 at 346-47, 354-56 passim; see also Scheppele,
supra note 20, at 125, 162 et seq. (making a similar argument).
241. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
242. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247 et seq. (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
243. See id at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Brudney, supra note 11,
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permitted its employees to use the information, Chiarella would
still have committed securities fraud.' The equal access ap-
proach has not attracted the judicial attention that the misap-
propriation theory has; nevertheless, it has been subject to some
academic criticism. Law and economics scholars have argued
that access can always be purchased in some way; one could, for
example, devote one's life to becoming a corporate director and
thus have the same legal access to corporate information. 5
Additionally, the equal access rule would seem to prohibit a
bidder and its accomplices from purchasing stock prior to an-
nouncement of the bid, while the price was still low, unless the
bidder's purchases were exempt because the bidder's information
is "personal." 6 The equal access theory avoids the remedy
problem presented by the misappropriation theory; nevertheless,
it is related to the misappropriation theory. To the extent that
the only people who have unequal access are people who receive
information that is protected legally (and so cannot be acquired
by others at any price), the access theory will cover the same
cases covered by the misappropriation theory, except to the
extent that a trader with permission from her employer is cov-
ered by the equal access rule but not the misappropriation theo-
ry.47 Additionally, because the equal access rule is based on
the public's lawful access to the information in question, it is
passim.
244. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a contrary view,
that permission by the "owner" of the information removes the case from regulation,
see United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1997); EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 270. The unequal access theory does not rest, as the
SEC's Cady, Roberts position did, on an imbalance of information between buyer and
seller. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Rather, it rests on the unequal
access to information between the two parties. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 252, n.2
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun limits his theory to information to which one
has unequal legal access. See id. at 247, 251. To say that the opposite trader might
have broken into the print shop to get the same information Chiarella had is not a
rebuttal to Justice Blackmun's argument.
245. See EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 254. Easterbrook and
Fischel also give as an example that anyone can gain access to an analyst's report
by hiring the analyst. See id. This treats an analyst's admittedly valuable opinion as
nonpublic information.
246. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
247. See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 330.
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closely related to property-based rules discussed below.'
C. Information as Property
Another popular fraud-by-silence rule is based on the charac-
terization of information as the property of some person or
entity. 9 Under this theory, news about corporate prospects is
corporate property and an employee of the company is prohibited
from using the information to her own advantage just as she is
prohibited from using other corporate property." Similarly,
the news of the pending takeover in Chiarella was the property
of the bidder, and neither the printing company nor the printer's
employees could benefit from the use of their client's property
without permission. Needless to say, perhaps, the misappropria-
tion theory derives from a property analysis.
Merely describing information as property does not determine
the extent to which the use of information should be prohibited.
Some commentators argue that the use of information should be
prohibited only when the use causes damage to the owner of the
property-by forestalling the owner's opportunity to profit, for
example, or by causing the information to be disclosed to the
owner's detrimentY To the extent that Chiarella's or
O'Hagan's trading caused an increase in the price of the target's
stock, it should be prohibited because the bidder who owned the
information would be damaged by having to pay a higher price
to acquire the target's stock. Conversely, the property theory
eliminates liability in those situations where damage cannot be
shown. Proponents of insider trading prohibitions have been
248. See id.; infra notes 249-65 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1987) (holding that
information is property for purposes of mail fraud statute).
250. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1997); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981) ("In other areas of the law, deceitful misap-
propriation of confidential information by a fiduciary, whether described as theft,
conversion, or breach of trust, has consistently been held to be unlawful.").
251. See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 331. It is not clear who would have the
burden of proof on the damage issue. Would the SEC, or a private plaintiff in a
civil damages action, have to show damage to the owner of the information, who
normally will not be a party to the suit, in order to claim that a stock trade violat-
ed Rule 10b-5? Would speculative harms, such as the loss of credibility that a finan-
cial publication suffers as a result of scalping, be sufficient?
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unable to identify a victim of insider trading because losses in
the stock market are rarely, if ever, caused by other traders. 2
The property theory solves that problem by requiring an identifi-
able victim, that is, someone who has been harmed, for the in-
sider trade to be wrongful. However, showing harm under the
property theory will be extremely difficult, because individual
trades rarely affect the market for a stock or result in disclosure
of the information." s Even true insider trading by corporate
executives in their own company's stock would often be permit-
ted under this rule.
An alternative formulation of the property theory would pro-
hibit use of information even when there is no damage to the
owner of the information.' Such a rule is consistent with the
"secret profit" rule of agency law, which requires that an agent
disgorge to his principal all profits derived by the agent from the
agency relationship, regardless of whether there has been a loss
to the principal. 5 Additionally, this rule is consistent with the
principle that an owner of property generally has a right to
compensation for another's use of the property, even if the owner
is not damaged by the use. 6 If Rule 10b-5 liability is to be de-
pendent on a showing of damage to the owner of the informa-
tion, then the liability cannot be said to derive from traditional
property law principles. 7
252. See infra notes 305-27 and accompanying text.
253. Insider trades that are disclosed publicly under SEC regulations may have an
effect on the market-the Wall Street Journal and other financial publications regu-
larly report such trades, presumably because readers find them relevant-but be-
cause such trades rarely involve nonpublic information, they are not at issue here.
254. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, cmt. c (1957) (stating that an
agent has a duty not to profit from a principal's confidential information even if
there is no harm to principal); Reading v. Attorney-General, 1951 App. Cas. 507
(appeal taken from C.A.).
256. See Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash. 1946) (determining
that a user of the plaintiffs machine must pay the plaintiff for the user's profits
even when the plaintiff put machinhe in storage). The court noted that "[tihe very
essence of the nature of property is the right to its exclusive use." Id.
257. It is not, of course, necessary for 10b-5 liability to be based on any existing
principles at all. But because the Supreme Court has precluded an interpretation of
Rule 10b-5 not based on common law fraud principles, a property-based liability rule
created out of whole cloth is unlikely to win the Court's favor. See supra note 18
and accompanying text.
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Like the other analyses described above, the property-based
approach to fraud by silence was not invented by the 10b-5 com-
mentators. Verplanck considered the role of property interests in
his 1825 commentary, in which he noted that traders often just-
ly regard information, especially information acquired through
considerable effort, as private property, which one is not re-
quired to transfer gratuitouslyY8 The common law insider
trading cases also considered property principles, albeit in a
different light. There, the argument went as follows:
The information as to the corporate affairs belongs to the
corporation and can be used only for its benefit or for the
benefit of each and all of its stockholders alike; and the at-
tempt by one director to gain advantage by it is a breach of
his obligation in the premises
An additional problem with the property theory is that it
depends upon a workable theory of how rights in information
are created. In most cases, the property rights protected under
the property theory will derive from some idea akin to the labor
theory of property.20 This would allow a trader to create prop-
erty rights in things not owned by anyone, such as publicly dis-
closed corporate data or even news of world events.26' The
258. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 9, 77; supra note 162 and accompanying
text.
259. Berle, supra note 52, at 836; see, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (Ga.
1903) ("In a certain sense the information is a quasi asset of the company, and the
shareholder is as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of asset as to any
other regularly entered on the list of the company's holding."); BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 25, at 225 n.6 (arguing that the director acquires information "only in
his capacity as a manager of the corporation. Ethically it would seem plain that the
information and any advantage from it belonged to the shareholders rather than to
the director personally.").
260. Although the courts have rejected the idea that effort alone can create a prop-
erty right in information, see, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 240 (1918), they have espoused the view that the right to protect informa-
tion derives from the fact that the information would not be produced without that
protection. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 96-7975, 96-7983
(CON), 96-9123 (XAP), 1997 LEXIS 1527, at *38 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 1997). The cost of
producing the information, in terms of effort and expense, is an essential feature
creating the right to protect the information.
261. The reasoning of International News Service v. Associated Press would be ap-
1998] 1337
1338 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1289
news of the treaty in Laidlaw presents an interesting situa-
tion."2 The news may have been the property of the two gov-
ernments who were parties to the treaty, but they had no inter-
est in preventing its disclosure. One might treat the news as the
property of the captain of the ship carrying the message, but
that rule might be offensive if the ship was carrying the news as
a public function. Nathan Rothschild's sailing across the English
Channel in bad weather to trade on the news of Waterloo would
perhaps be a different matter.6 ' Similarly, an analyst who
"crunched" industry numbers presumably would have a property
right in the result, even though she could not have a property
right in publicly available raw data.2" By incorporating an ex-
isting set of complex rules determining when information be-
comes property, the property theory would address the policy
concerns served by those rules. Alternatively, the property theo-
ry would subject fraud-by-silence law to the uncertainty and
controversy present in the underlying property law, just as the
fiduciary trading rule subjects fraud-by-silence law to the con-
tinuing debate over fiduciary duties."
plicable here. See International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 215. A court would not,
presumably, protect an analyst's early knowledge of a change in Federal Reserve
interest rate policy, see id. at 234 (declaring that news reports are publici juris), but
it might protect the analyst's report describing how the change would affect a given
company or market sector.
262. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 178 (1817).
263. This story is apparently apocryphal. The Rothschild messenger, not Nathan
himself, did arrive in London before Wellington's official envoy, but the rest of the
story, including the Rothchilds' stock market profits as a result of the early news,
was invented. See COUNT EGON CAESAR CORTI, THE RISE OF THE HOUSE OF
ROTHSCHILD 156-57 (Brian & Beatrix Lunn, trans., Western Islands 1972) (1927).
264. Cf JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the State that
Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with and joyned to
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property."). But see Feist
Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-61 (1991) (determining
that there is no property right in telephone listings even if the gathering involved
labor).
265. The property theory would have to address the problem presented by those
who acquire information accidentally. Traditional property analysis would ask
whether the owner had "abandoned" her rights in the property, which in the infor-
mation context might approximate the expectation of privacy analysis used in the
context of the Fourth Amendment and attorney-client privilege.
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D. Fairness and the Standards of the Business Community
Another characteristic of fraud by silence that commentators
raise with considerable regularity is "fairness." The concept of
fairness has been criticized as being "messy" and lacking con-
tent,. 6 and in fact, courts rarely cite fairness as a basis for
their decisions, even in the strongest proplaintiff cases.267 Nev-
ertheless, the idea that trading on the basis of nonpublic infor-
mation is "just not right" is an enduring one." Commentators
usually have defined fairness in this context according to stan-
dards generally accepted in the business community. Some com-
mentators have argued that trading on nonpublic information is
fair, and should be permitted, whenever the risk of the existence
of nonpublic information is one of the assumptions of the trans-
action.26 If the existence of the information is foreseeable, if
"[aill know that a wide difference exists among men in these
points,"270 then the information may be used. In Laidlaw, each
merchant would know that the other might have a different
view of the outcome of the war, and each was free to trade based
on that view. Neither would suspect, however, that the other
had actual knowledge of the war's end.27' In other words, if the
266. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 323-24 et seq.; see also EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 261-62 (refuting arguments for the position that
managers' trading is unfair).
267. Courts sometimes raise fairness as an element of the duty of "utmost fairness"
traditionally imposed on fiduciaries. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531, 535
(Kan. 1932). But see Allen, supra note 108, at 183 (arguing that the "vague, empty
or meaningless" concept of fairness is a legitimate concern for the courts).
268. Scheppele, supra note 20, at 123 (quoting Henry Manne's anecdote about a
law student who stamped her foot and declared "I don't care; it's just not right.").
But see MANNE, supra note 117, at 93 ("It is not enough simply to say that insider
trading is unfair. If it is unfair, it must be unfair to somebody.").
269. See FRIED, supra note 10, at 82 ("these risks are part of the assumptions of
the deal"); cf. VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 119 ("It is always fraudulent in con-
tracts, to take advantage in any respect whatever, wherein it is of course presumed
by the one side, and understood by the other to be so presumed, that no advantage
will be taken.")
270. VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 119.
271. See it at 122; see also id. at 1-3 (noting that news of the end of the war was
unexpected completely in New Orleans when the tobacco purchase occurred); cf 2
KENT, supra note 34, at 383 n.a (criticizing Verplanck for finding fraud in the "ten
thousand cases in which... men deal with each other at arm's length, and with an
entire and exclusive reliance upon their own judgment, knowledge, and examination").
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transaction involves deep secrets, that is, "secrets whose exis-
tence one does not even suspect,"272 then the transaction is un-
fair and should be prohibited.273
The general "assumption of the deal" rule has been used to
create more specific rules. For example, the rule that fiduciaries
have a duty of full disclosure before they trade may be explained
by the fact that one of the assumptions of the fiduciary relation-
ship is precisely that the fiduciary will not take advantage of
superior knowledge, among other things. 4 Similarly, a horse
trader does not have a duty to disclose superior information
about the horse precisely because everyone knows that horse
trading is subject to sharp practices, and everyone is therefore
on his or her guard.275 In a stock transaction, the rule would
permit an insider to sell stock based on his knowledge of busi-
ness generally, and of his business, in particular. This is permit-
ted because "[t]he buyer knows that there is a great difference
among men in their management of their money concerns, and
their knowledge of all that relates to it, and this[] he has no
reason to suppose may not also exist between him and [the
insider]." 27 6 For example, an insurance company executive may
sell his company's stock if he believes insurance premiums do
not compensate adequately for risks. If the executive has "intel-
ligence of distant losses, which have sunk half of [the company's]
272. Scheppele, supra note 20, at 158.
273. See id. at 157-60. Both Scheppele and Verplanck use games of chance as an
example of this rule. Scheppele compares the usual lottery situation, in which the
odds of winning are calculable by anyone, to one in which, unbeknownst to the play-
ers, the lottery commission periodically removes some numbers from play. In the
latter situation, the commission's action would be a deep secret and would make the
game unfair. See id. Verplanck also uses the example of "contracts of hazard," in-
cluding lotteries and horse races, that are considered unfair if one party has private
information. VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 139.
274. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 189.
275. See id. at 209-10.
276. Id. at 122. Another feature of such information is that it is theoretically avail-
able to anyone with the sagacity or other resources to acquire it. Whether some trad-
ers have a monopoly on information may also be a factor in determining when a trade
is "fair," although most commentators treat the two considerations separately. See,
e.g., Keeton, supra note 37, at 32-33 ("the opportunity which the uninformed person
might have to ascertain the fact not disclosed is a factor of importance" in determin-
ing the fairness of the transaction); Scheppele, supra note 20, at 157-60 (discussing
assumption of the deal); id. at 160-62 (addressing the monopoly on information).
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capital, and [the executive and his] brother directors conceal it
until [they] have disposed of [their] own stock at the current
rate, this is no longer a fair use of superior knowledge."277
An alternative formulation of the assumption of the deal rule
focuses on the prevailing standards in this business community.
Needless to say, perhaps, this is a linguistic rather than a sub-
stantive difference because the prevailing standards in the busi-
ness community will determine what information is assumed to
be within the deal and what information is instead a deep se-
cret. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts includes as one of
the few instances in which nondisclosure of a fact will amount to
misrepresentation when "non-disclosure of the fact amQunts to a
failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing."278 Similarly, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts discusses this concept at length:
The continuing development of modern business ethics has...
limited to some extent [the] privilege to take advantage of igno-
rance. In general, the cases in which the rule [requiring dis-
closure] has been applied have been those in which the advan-
tage taken of the plaintiff's ignorance is so shocking to the ethi-
cal sense of the community, and is so extreme and unfair, as to
amount to a form of swindling, in which the plaintiff is led by
appearances into a bargain that is a trap, of whose essence and
substance he is unaware. In such a case, even in a tort action for
deceit, the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the loss
that he has sustained .... There are indications, also, that with
changing ethical attitudes in many fields of modem business,
the concept of facts basic to the transaction may be expanding
and the duty to use reasonable care to disclose the facts may be
increasing somewhat.279
277. VERPLANCI, supra note 26, at 121-22. Professor Scheppele has a somewhat dif-
ferent take on the insider trading context. She argues that insider trading involves
inherently "deep secrets," even when other participants know that insider trading
may be taking place, because the existence of an impersonal market in which trad-
ers do not have any information other than price and do not know the identity of
the opposite party makes it impossible for a participant to judge accurately the risk
that she is trading in the face of nonpublic information. Scheppele, supra note 20, at
159-60.
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1979).
279. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. 1 (1977).
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Professor Keeton argued in 1936 that whether nondisclosure
should amount to fraud is a question "of fair conduct, just as
negligence is a question of fair conduct,"2 ' and therefore the
standard to be applied could be determined by consulting the
reasonable man. Keeton proposed that the law determine what
"the man of ordinary moral sensibilities would have done; would
he have disclosed the information or would he have remained
silent?"28' The ordinary man also makes an appearance in
Verplanck's commentary on Laidlaw:
[T]he virtuous and benevolent man will find in his own com-
mon sense, and in his determination to do unto his
neighbours as he would that they should do unto him, much
surer guides for his conduct in every situation of life, than
any logical or technical rule can afford. Yet the decisions of
such a man.., must involve some uniform principle.'
Verplanck then attempted in the rest of his book to explain that
uniform principle. The law, according to Verplanck, should com-
port with common sense, which the extreme rule of caveat emp-
tor does not. "[Wihenever in a law report," he wrote, "I meet
with one of these moldy scraps of bad Latin, I always prepare to
find some argument or decision startling to common sense."2"
Interestingly, the Rule 10b-5 literature has not made much
use of the concept of fair conduct, perhaps because the Chiarella
decision seems to reject such a flexible standard, perhaps be-
cause the law and economics movement has driven such con-
cepts underground.2" One of the few recent commentators to
make a fairness argument dressed it in a contractarian analysis
280. Keeton, supra note 37, at 32.
281. Id. Keeton then listed a number of factors that could be used to determine
what the "ordinary ethical person" would do. Id. at 34-37. Among the factors Keeton
discussed are the relation the parties bear to one another, the manner in which the
information is acquired, the nature of the fact not disclosed (e.g., intrinsic or extrin-
sic), whether the party with the knowledge was a buyer or seller, the nature of the
contract, and the materiality of the fact. See id.
282. VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 10-11.
283. Id. at 219.
284. Manne, one of the founding fathers of the law and economics approach to
insider trading, acknowledged the role of fairness in a rarely cited passage. See
supra note 268.
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to make it more palatableY Nevertheless, the concept of fair-
ness is alive and well in the common law of fraud, as the ex-
cerpts presented above indicate. Additionally, fairness concerns
may underlie many of the judicial decisions on insider trading,
perhaps producing the seemingly inconsistent, in theoretical
terms, results of the cases.
E. Buyers v. Sellers
Finally, it is worth mentioning one distinction recognized by
the common law in sales that has never been advocated as a
meaningful distinction between stock traders: the distinction
between buyers and sellers. At common law, a seller's failure to
disclose a defect not readily discoverable by inspection was ac-
tionable as deceit. 6 A buyer, however, was under no obliga-
tion to disclose facts to a seller, provided that the buyer did not
mislead the seller in any way. 7 This distinction may have re-
flected the fact that sellers generally have intimate knowledge of
the items in question, whereas buyers do not.' In commercial
transactions, however, that generalization would not hold true.
An end-user buyer might have more knowledge about an item
than a middleman-seller, and in a transaction between two mid-
dlemen, both parties might be ignorant of the goods' defects and
characteristics. This may explain the courts' failure to apply the
buyer-seller distinction consistently." 9
In stock transactions under the mandatory disclosure system
established by the 1934 Act, there is no reason to suppose that
sellers (existing shareholders) will have better knowledge of the
company or the market than buyers who may, in fact, also be
shareholders. Alternatively, if one applies a strict fiduciary test
to identify fraud, then only seller-shareholders would have a
285. See Scheppele, supra note 20.
286. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMsiON LAW 270-282 (1988); Dalley, supra note 10, at 424-28.
287. See id.
288. See Keeton, supra note 37, at 21; cf. SCHEPPELE, supra note 286, at 270 (argu-
ing that "caveat emptor was not stacked against ignorant buyers in favor of crafty
and devious sellers").
289. See Dalley, supra note 10, at 426-28; see also VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 70
(noting that Roman law did not recognize a difference between buyers and sellers).
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cause of action, and only against insider-buyers. In the words of
Judge Learned Hand, "it would be a sorry distinction to allow
[an insider] to use the advantage of his position to induce the
buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he was forbid-
den to do so once the buyer had become one."290 The distinction
has never been important in the insider trading context.
III. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE INSIDER TRADING
CONTEXT
Two features distinguish late twentieth century insider trad-
ing from garden variety common law fraud. One of those fea-
tures is the existence of a trading environment full of informa-
tion about all publicly traded stocks, and the other is the exis-
tence of an impersonal market for those stocks.29' Oddly, the
federal courts have not considered these features in their
Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. Nevertheless, both features have fig-
ured prominently in the insider trading debate, and both have
common law roots.
A. The Environment of Existing Information
As discussed above, the common law recognizes a duty to
disclose between a fiduciary and beneficiary.292 The common
law also imposes a duty to disclose information on a party who
is responsible for her trading opposite's incorrect informa-
tion.9 ' There are generally three ways in which one party can
cause another's ignorance. First, a party who takes steps to
disguise facts that would otherwise be obvious, who, in other
290. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951), quoted in Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980) and In re Cady, Roberts and Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 914 n.23 (1961). This point is reflected in fiduciary law outside the cor-
porate context by the existence of prerelationship duties between principals and
agents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 23 (1958).
291. There are two other features unique to insider trading under Rule 10b-5 that
are beyond the scope of this Article. One is the fact that a violation of Rule 10b-5
can carry criminal penalties; the other is that regulation is by the federal govern-
ment, rather than by the states. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994).
292. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
293. See FRIED, supra note 10, at 78-81.
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words, engages in "active concealment," for example by painting
over termite damage, is under a duty to disclose full informa-
tion.' Second, a party who makes statements that, although
technically accurate, contain misleading omissions, in other
words, half-truths, is also under a duty to disclose the true
facts."' Third, a party who makes true statements that later
become inaccurate is under a duty to disclose the change in
circumstances." 6 This last rule is particularly relevant in the
insider trading context.
Today's stock transactions take place in an environment in
which a vast amount of information is available to all trad-
ers.297 Most of this information either comes directly from the
issuer of the stock or is derived from such issuer informa-
tion.9 The issuer and those individuals who are in control of
294. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1977); 2 WILiAm
BLACKSTONE, COiMENTARIES *452 (1766); FRIED, supra note 10, at 78; Keeton, supra
note 37, at 3. The termite example is from Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 (Wash.
1960), discussed in FRIED, supra note 10, at 78 et seq. and Kronman, supra note
217, at 24-25. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (1979) (stating
that action preventing another from learning a fact is equivalent to a misrepresenta-
tion and may make a contract voidable).
295. See, e.g., Buckley v. Buckley, 202 N.W. 955 (Mich. 1925), cited in Heinselman,
supra note 52, at 627; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(b); Dalley, supra
note 10, at 438; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 cmt. b (1979)
(stating that a half-truth is equivalent to a misrepresentation).
296. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c); Keeton, supra note 37,
at 6-7 (describing what he calls "continuing misrepresentations"); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(a) (stating that failure to correct prior state-
ments that have become inaccurate is equivalent to a misrepresentation).
297. This fact has been used to support an argument that imposing liability on
insiders is unnecessary in publicly held companies, unlike close corporations, because
the public traders are not dependent on the insiders for information. See Walker,
supra note 64, at 641.
298. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 326.
The continuous description of their businesses and prospects by publicly
held corporations to their investors-and to the public-is evidenced not
merely by mandated information and periodic financial reports, but by
regular reports to stockholders, by extensive and frequent press releases,
by meetings with securities analysts (both formal in assembly and infor-
mal in individual meetings), and by advertisements in the media....
[Ilt can fairly be said that anybody considering an investment deci-
sion . . . with respect to the stock of a publicly held company will be
acting on the basis of extensive information proffered by the corporation
up until the moment of his decision.... [He can be said to have been
given a certain impression of the enterprise and its prospects from its
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the issuer, in other words, insiders, are directly or indirectly
responsible for the information available to the marketplace.299
At least in theory, all of this information is reflected in the price
of a security, so that even a trader who bases his or her decision
solely on price will in fact be acting in reliance on all of the
available information."' 0 Under common law fraud principles,
when a change in circumstances occurs that makes the existing
information misleading, in other words, when not-yet-public
news develops, those responsible for the existing informa-
tion-the issuer and its insiders-should be under a duty to
disclose the new information before entering into a transaction
on that basis.0 1
The duty-to-correct rule is in fact reflected in the language of
Rule 10b-5 and in other rules and regulations applicable to issu-
ers. 0 2 Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful "to omit to state a materi-
own published utterances, both mandated and not mandated.
Id.
299. See id. When considering the adequacy of corporate disclosure, courts look to
the "total mix" of available information, not only to individual disclosure documents.
See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). This too reflects
legal recognition of the amount of information available to the market in general.
300. This is the efficient capital markets hypothesis. For a general discussion, see
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, MONEY MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS AND CLIENTS 296-98
(1993); for a scholarly discussion, see Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis,
in FINANCE 127 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). This is
also not a particularly recent phenomenon. See VERPLANCK, supra note 26, at 108-12
(stating that the market price of an item reflects the sum of information relating to
the item); cf Nielson, supra note 156, at 350 (asserting that false or inaccurate
information causes harm to whole market).
301. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 327.
In the light of the continuous creation of a particular impression of cor-
porate affairs by the corporation, if events occur that make that previous-
ly created impression materially misleading, failure to communicate the
occurrence of those events may plausibly be taken to be a representa-
tion--or at least may fairly permit investors to infer-that all previous
disclosures remain accurate and complete and furnish an adequate basis
for the investment decision of the outsider. In the language of the stat-
utes, the failure to disclose those events constitutes an omission to state
material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
Id.
302. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951). It is not clear, however, that issuers have a
general duty under the securities acts to disclose new information. See generally Safe
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al fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading." °30  The rule does not, obviously, extend to
noninsiders or even, presumably, to low-level corporate employ-
ees who are not in a position to control corporate disclosure. The
rule would, however, apply to both market and company infor-
mation,3' to the extent that that information made the exist-
ing mix of information misleading. The fact that the duty to
correct would apply only to insiders who are already covered by
Rule 10b-5 under the fiduciary trading rule probably explains
the courts' lack of interest in this theory.
B. The Impersonal Stock Market
Most stock transactions today take place in an organized, im-
personal market in which buyers and sellers never meet."5 In
fact, buyers and sellers do not know, and probably cannot learn,
each other's identity.0 6 This fact has a number of consequenc-
es for the definition of fraud by silence. For example, the integri-
ty of the market argument discussed above, which is based on
the existence and importance of national stock markets, has
been used to justify a broad insider trading prohibition.0 7 Fur-
thermore, the efficient functioning of a stock market requires
Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 7101, [1994-1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,436, at 85,787 (Oct. 13, 1994) (dis-
cussing the uncertainty in law regarding the duty to update); 7 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 4, at 3517-19 et seq. (discussing SEC regulations requiring issuers to
correct and update information); id, at 3510-14 (describing stock exchange rules re-
quiring prompt disclosure of new information).
303. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
304. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
305. This is by no means a recent development. Even early cases noted the exis-
tence of stock markets. In Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 586 (N.Y. App. Div.
1868), the court rather quaintly argued in dicta that the market price of a security
does not reflect the "real" value of the company, and, therefore, an insider's informa-
tion about the company would not be an advantage in a transaction for a market-
traded stock. Other cases noting the existence of markets include Smock v.
Henderson, 1 Wils. 241 (Ind. 1872), and Deck v. Feld, 38 Mo. App. 674 (1890). Im-
personal transactions occur not only on the exchanges, but also in the over-the-
counter market and electronic trading systems.
306. For a comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon, see WANG & STEINBERG,
supra note 25, at 48-61.
307. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
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dissemination of material information, and any insider trading
prohibition should foster, or at least, not impede, that goal." 8
Similarly, the structure of the market gives corporate managers
the power to affect, and manipulate, the price of the
corporation's securities,00 and insider trading rules may affect
managers' incentives to manipulate stock prices and create mar-
ket volatility."'
Commentators on insider trading law have debated the signif-
icance of impersonal markets for decades. Some pre-1934 courts
argued that the duty to disclose should be stricter in an imper-
sonal market in which the trader's identity cannot serve a sig-
naling function to other traders.3 "' The fact that a buyer and
seller are in a fiduciary relationship, however, loses much of its
significance in a transaction on an exchange. 312 Courts and com-
mentators have long argued that where there is no negotiation,
no discussion, and no reliance on the information given, in other
words, where there is no face-to-face transaction, the common
law fraud rules should not apply.3" This fact is evidenced alleg-
edly by the fact that every common law insider trading case that
found insider liability concerned a face-to-face transaction."
308. See supra note 228 and accompanying text; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 25, at 293-94 (describing the market's mechanisms for collecting and disseminat-
ing facts). This goal is especially important if the original purpose of the 1934 Act was
to ensure the "integrity" of security prices. See Thel, supra note 13, at 391-92.
309. See Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234-45 (Ga. 1903).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
311. See, e.g., Boulden v. Stilwell, 60 A. 609, 612 (Md. 1905); see also Strong v.
Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (declaring that the defendant's use of a straw man to
purchase the plaintiffs stock was strong evidence of fraud); Keeton, supra note 37,
at 26 (describing situations where a buyer has been held liable for failing to dis-
close identity).
312. See Oliver, 45 S.E. at 235.
313. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933); Allen, supra
note 108, at 177-79; Scheppele, supra note 20, at 137-38. But see BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 25, at 226 n.9 (noting that insider traders in impersonal markets are no
happier to have their trades publicized than are traders in face-to-face transactions);
Berle, supra note 52, at 835 (rejecting the argument that there is no contact be-
tween an insider trader and her opposite in an impersonal market because the
corporation's public disclosures create such contact).
314. See, e.g., 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 3476 (ascribing the lack of
market-based cases to a privity requirement); Walker, supra note 64, at 641.
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Nevertheless, the securities laws would seem to apply particu-
larly to market transactions, and if Rule 10b-5 liability does
not extend to market transactions, it will have almost no force
at all.3
15
The fact that insider trading occurs primarily in an imperson-
al market is probably most significant in that it makes the igno-
rant trader's loss difficult to identify.16 Because traders in the
market do not know the identity of their opposite traders, the
fact that any given trader has traded with an insider trader will
be completely fortuitous. The insider trader's opposite is com-
pletely indistinguishable from all of the other traders in the
market. Why then should that trader have a cause of action
while other traders do not? Congress has solved this problem by
giving a cause of action to all contemporaneous opposite traders,
whether they were in fact the ones who traded with the insid-
er.317 Another problem arises from the fact that the other trad-
ers in the market would have traded even if the insider had ab-
stained from trading, as required by the disclose-or-abstain
rule.318 The insider cannot be said to have caused the other
traders' losses because their decision to trade or not to trade was
made completely independent of the insider.3 9 The response to
this is that the harm has been caused by the insider's failure to
disclose, not by her trade.32 As discussed above, the other
traders' decisions are based primarily on the price of the securi-
315. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914-15 (1961); see also Tamar
Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property
Law, 73 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 389, 403 n.58 (1993) (describing common law fraud
as appropriate for face-to-face transactions and Rule 10b-5 as appropriate for trans-
actions in impersonal markets),
316. For a comprehensive discussion of the debate over who is harmed by insider
trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 41-115. See also EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 345-48; MANNE, supra note 117, at 99-110.
317. In other words, if an insider buys stock, all contemporaneous sellers have a
cause of action against the insider. This rule solves the practical problem that it is
often impossible to match an insider's trades with those of other traders. See supra
note 306 and accompanying text.
318. See MANNE, supra note 117, at 94-96; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at
99-104.
319. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 25, at 44; Allen, supra note 108, at 178;
Walker, supra note 64, at 640-41.
320. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 25, at 321-25; WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 25, at 42-47; Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1239.
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ty, and the price of the security reflects the current state of
information. 2' If material, nonpublic information exists, which
will necessarily be the case if there is an insider trader, then the
market price of the security is, in a sense, "wrong." That means,
of course, that not only those who actually traded opposite the
insider, but also those who decided to refrain from trading the
security, and, in fact, everyone who acted or refrained from
acting based on the market price, are damaged.322 The harm, in
effect, is to the market in general."s If that is the case, however,
why do only contemporaneous opposite traders have a cause of
action against insider traders?
3 1
The existence of an impersonal market has thus created some
complications for fraud-by-silence law, and insider trading law is
unique in fraud law in being dependent upon stock market me-
chanics and potentially variable patterns of market behav-
ior.3  It is not clear, however, whether such issues should affect
the fraud-by-silence rule itself or only the application of the rule.
Because the difficulty of identifying harm arises with any knowl-
edgeable trader in a stock market transaction, even true insid-
ers, that difficulty can only support a rule allowing all insider
trading or giving only the SEC, not individual traders, the right
to sue knowledgeable traders. That rule would approximate the
common law of fraud, when, in the absence of causation and
harm, the law does not apply unless a crime was involved. Be-
cause Congress 2 and the Supreme Court 27 have both rejected
321. See supra note 300 and accompanying text; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 25, at 281-87, 314-15 (noting that traders make trading decisions in reliance on
the market price).
322. This is true for other forms of securities fraud as well. In Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749-54 (1975), the Supreme Court held that
those who refrained from trading because of inaccurately gloomy corporate disclosure
did not have a cause of action because section 10(b) protects only buyers and sellers.
323. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 25, at 327; Nielson, supra note 156, at 346.
324. This problem could be solved by doing away with a private right of action
under Rule 10b-5 for insider trading and leaving enforcement to the SEC.
325. Even market mechanics are changing, as electronic trading becomes more com-
mon. See generally Division of Market Regulation, SEC, Market 2000: An Examina-
tion of Current Equity Market Developments, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 85,311, at 85,029-36 (Jan. 27, 1994) (studying the future composi-
tion of participants in the U.S. equity market, the growth of alternative market
systems, and the role of technology in the future market).
326. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b) (1994) (giving a cause of action to those who did not
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that rule, however, the relevance of the lack of harm argument
is unclear.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article's concern has been to identify concepts in the
insider trading literature that have appeared repeatedly over
the past two centuries. 328 The inability of the law and of Amer-
ican legal scholars to make any progress on the fraud-by-silence
question is startling. In areas in which legislation has derogated
from the common law rules, as with the securities acts and con-
sumer protection acts, the law now often requires disclosure by
knowledgeable traders in circumstances where the common law
did not do so. The common law concept of fraud by silence, how-
ever, continues to be poorly defined, as does insider trading,
which, because of the nonspecific language of Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, combined with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of that language, also continues to be essentially a
common law concept. Not only has the common law been unable
in 160 years to resolve the issues raised by Laidlaw v. Organ, but
legal commentators have also been unable to make any progress
on the policy concerns, legal arguments, and theoretical founda-
tions of the analysis. Despite the parade of intellectual move-
ments during this period, from classicism to realism to economic
analysis, the actual analysis, that is, the identity of the argu-
ments considered, has remained the same.
What conclusion can we draw from this essential stagnation? It
may reflect the basic intractability of the problem, but it may also
reflect the limited utility of the legal method of handling certain
nonlegal concepts. When the jurists' multitudinous legal distinc-
tions and theories failed, they often returned to nonlegal concepts,
such as fairness or common sense, or to legal surrogates for those
concepts, such as the reasonably ethical person standard or the
trade with the insider trader).
327. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997) (describing harm
to "members of the investing public).
328. It is no doubt the case that the repetition of concepts is the result of borrow-
ing, regardless of whether attributed by later writers, but I have not tried to track
connections between specific authors.
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standards of the business community, as presenting a solution to
the problem. Even those most hostile to such ambiguous concepts
proposed legal rules that will ultimately result in a similar analy-
sis. A market-based approach, for example, that would allow
companies and insiders to determine their own rules and then
allow investors to vote with their wallets for the rules they prefer,
would not be particularly different in practice than a standards-
of-the-community rule that allows only such behavior as the busi-
ness community agrees should be permitted."9
Perhaps, then, the recurring references to fairness and busi-
ness standards, on the one hand, and the continual but always
unsatisfactory rearranging of the other arguments described
above, on the other, reflect the common law's inability, at least in
this area, to define what is right and what is wrong. If this is the
case, then the fraud-by-silence problem may never be "solved"
except by legislation. In this respect, the common law insider
trading cases are illustrative. The minority and majority views
arose at about the same time and coexisted for fifty years or more,
with neither rule making much headway. The rules rarely were
supported by satisfactory reasoning; rather, the courts relied
instead on invective about morality, trust, sound business prac-
tice, and the relative positions of the parties. In short, the courts
seem to have been driven by their own senses of right and wrong
but were unable to provide a consistent "legal" justification for the
rules they were announcing. The cases applying Rule 10b-5 are
not very different. The misappropriation theory has allowed some
courts, most notably the Second Circuit, to reach a favored result
without a coherent basis for liability, but other courts have reject-
ed nonlegislative attempts to limit the hurly-burly of the stock
market."' 0 One solution is simply for the legislature to step in
329. See Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 335.
330. This sort of ad hoc decision making is also not new; the struggle between
allowing judicial discretion to reach correct results and limiting judicial arbitrariness
by requiring courts to follow doctrine has been a continuing theme of jurisprudence.
The search for a definition of fraud by silence may be simply another example of
judges doing what they believe is best and lawyers and appellate courts trying to
restrict their ability to do so with rules, definitions, and theories. See, e.g., ROSCOE
PoUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 48-71 (1922); Karl N.
Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the New Jurisprudence, 40 COL. L. REV. 581
(1940).
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once again, as it has from time to time considered in the insider
trading context.331 But is the common law itself powerless to
provide a consistent fraud-by-silence rule? Unless the courts are
willing to rule that generally held ethical standards exist and are
a legitimate basis for legal rulemaking,332 fraud by silence may
never be more than a concept without parameters.
331. Cf. JEREMY BENTHAm, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 241 (H.LA Hart ed., Athlone
Press 1970) (1782) (describing the role of a legislator in curbing judicial discretion).
332. There is some precedent for a legal regime based on common ethics. Until the
eighteenth century, commercial law was generally governed by the law merchant,
rather than the common law. The law merchant was an international body of law
based on the practices of, and enforced by, the commercial community. See 1 WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 264 (1765); Thomas Edward Scrutton, General
Survey of the History of the Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 7, 8-9 (Assoc. of Am. Law Sch. ed., 1909). Even today, commercial
communities sharing general moral and ethical values continue to provide their own
legal systems. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Con-
tractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUDS. 115, 140-48 (1992)
(discussing the historical importance of "reputation bonds" and ethnic and cultural
homogeneity in the diamond industry).
1998] 1353
